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RELUCTANCE TO RESENTENCE:
COURTS, CONGRESS, AND COLLATERAL
REVIEW*
SARAH FRENCH RUSSELL**
In a series of recent decisions, the Supreme Court overturned a
number of circuit court opinions and adopted a more narrow
reading of certain federal recidivist sentencing enhancements.
Although the decisions revealed that many federal prisoners were
sentenced incorrectly and are serving sentences that are much
longer than they should be, few of these prisoners have obtained
relief in the lower courts on collateral review. Courts have
generally dismissed the claims on procedural grounds, citing
interests in finality. Indeed, courts often refuse to correct
sentencing errors on collateral review, even when both the judge
and the prosecutor acknowledge that the prisoner is serving
additional years in prison based on a sentencing mistake. After a
criminal judgment has become "final," federal courts appear
reluctant to resentence.
Federal prisoners seeking collateral review of sentences are
subject to the same-and in some cases stricter-procedural
barriers to relief as those seeking the more drastic remedy of
undoing their convictions. But sentencing errors should be easier
to fix than conviction-based errors because arguments favoring
finality are much weaker in the sentencing context. Correcting a
sentence is vastly easier than retrying a case, and staleness of
evidence is not a major concern at a resentencing because judges,
unlike juries, can rely on previous findings. Outside the special
context of capital cases, the important distinctions between
collateral review of sentences and convictions have received little
attention from courts or scholars.
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Given the backdrop of extensive litigation in the lower courts
about correcting sentencing errors at the collateral review stage,
and the possibility that the Supreme Court will need to resolve
divergent circuit decisions in this area, now is an important
moment to consider whether interests in finality should carry as
much weight when a court reviews a sentence rather than a
conviction in a collateral proceeding, and when the federal court
is reviewing its own decision rather than the decision of a state
court. Courts have been overstating the interests in finality of
sentences. They should be correcting more sentencing mistakes
on collateral review, at least where an intervening decision has
narrowed the reach of a substantive sentencing provision.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2000, Marcus Jones was sentenced to 327 months'
imprisonment for being a felon in possession of a firearm.' This
sentence was based on the district court's conclusion that Jones had
three prior convictions that triggered the Armed Career Criminal Act
("ACCA").2 Ordinarily, possession of a firearm by a felon carries a
statutory sentencing range of zero to ten years' imprisonment.' With
the ACCA enhancement, however, the sentencing range is raised to a
mandatory minimum of fifteen years and a maximum of life.4 Eight
years after Jones was sentenced, the Supreme Court's decision in
Begay v. United States' established that the types of prior convictions
on Jones's record should not have triggered the enhanced ACCA
penalties.6 It is now undisputed that Jones was sentenced incorrectly
and is serving a sentence that is seventeen years longer than is
authorized under a proper interpretation of the law. However, the
Sixth Circuit recently denied him relief.
The Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, denied a similar claim by
Ezell Gilbert, whose sentencing range for crack distribution was
increased from 151 to 188 months' imprisonment to 292 to 365
months based on the erroneous conclusion that his prior offense of
carrying a concealed weapon triggered the career offender
1. Jones v. Castillo, No. 10-5376, 2012 WL 2947933, at *1 (6th Cir. July 20, 2012) (per
curiam).
2. Id.
3. 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(a)(2), 922(g)(1) (2006).
4. See id. § 924(e)(1).
5. 553 U.S. 137 (2008).
6. Id. at 148.
7. Jones, 2012 WL 2947933, at *1.
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enhancement under the Sentencing Guidelines. 8 After Begay, it is
undisputed that Gilbert was sentenced incorrectly. Although the
dissent argued that the court had "shirked [its] duty" by failing to
correct the error,9 the majority concluded that finality interests
trumped and denied Gilbert relief."o
Federal courts today appear to be reluctant to resentence. Even
when there have been clear and significant sentencing errors like
those described above, federal prisoners face great difficulty in
correcting the error once the period of direct appellate review is
complete and the criminal judgment has become "final." Although
criminal defendants can challenge many sentencing errors through
the direct appeals process, some errors do not become apparent until
that process is complete-for example, when a new case such as
Begay establishes the illegality of the sentence, or when a prisoner
discovers only later that counsel made a mistake. Yet it is surprisingly
difficult to fix these errors at the collateral review stage. Courts often
deny relief even in the face of an undisputed sentencing error that is
causing someone to spend many extra years in prison."
Courts and scholars have long debated society's interest in the
finality of criminal judgments and the appropriate scope of collateral
review." However, outside the special context of capital cases, little
attention has been paid to the distinctions between collateral review
of sentences versus convictions. Yet there are major differences.
Concerns about finality are much less pressing when a court
8. Gilbert v. United States, 640 F.3d 1293, 1300 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
9. Id. at 1333 (Martin, J., dissenting).
10. Id. at 1310.
11. See discussion infra Part II.B.
12. Much of the habeas scholarship focuses on the appropriate scope of federal review
of claims by state prisoners. See, e.g., Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal
Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 441 (1963); Gary Peller, In
Defense of Federal Habeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 579, 665-69
(1982); Larry W. Yackle, State Convicts and Federal Courts: Reopening the Habeas Corpus
Debate, 91 CORNELL L. REv. 541, 541-42 (2006). Scholars have also frequently explored
the special issues raised in the death penalty context. See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker & Jordan
M. Steiker, Cost and Capital Punishment: A New Consideration Transforms an Old
Debate, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 117, 137-50. Recently, scholarship has examined issues
raised by executive detention and the "war on terror." See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr. &
Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, Substantive Rights, and the War on Terror,
120 HARV. L REV. 2029, 2045-49 (2007). Some have argued that the "terror cases" are
not so different from ordinary cases involving detained persons. See Judith Resnik,
Detention, the War on Terror, and the Federal Courts, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 579, 581-84
(2010). Issues surrounding post-conviction review of claims by federal prisoners in
ordinary cases have received relatively little attention, and scholars have rarely focused on
correction of noncapital sentencing errors at the collateral review stage.
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reconsiders the length of a sentence rather than the validity of a
conviction.
Those favoring finality of criminal judgments argue, among other
things, that a broad scope of collateral review expends limited
resources and can lead to less accurate fact-finding because evidence
goes stale over time." However, correcting a defendant's sentence in
a noncapital case uses considerably less time and resources than
retrying a case. When a federal prisoner seeks collateral review of a
sentence, the federal judge who imposed the original sentence
reviews the matter and is already familiar with the case.14
Determining whether there was an error in the sentence is usually a
simple and straightforward task. When a mistake is made, the court
can then decide whether it actually impacted the ultimate sentence
and correct the sentence only in those instances. Some sentencing
errors can be corrected without the need for the defendant's presence
and a full resentencing proceeding.15 Even if a full proceeding is
needed, it usually only takes about an hour. Thus, collateral review of
sentence-based errors drains resources to a much lesser extent than
review of convictions. Indeed, reducing a sentence of imprisonment
to its lawful length actually saves resources that would have otherwise
been spent on unnecessary incarceration."
In addition, staleness of evidence is of less concern when a court
corrects a sentence. When a conviction is vacated years later, it is
often difficult to retry the case because witnesses may die or forget
details, and evidence may decay. In contrast, at a resentencing, the
court, unlike a jury at trial, can rely on evidence presented and
findings made at the initial sentencing proceeding.17
Given these important differences, one might expect it to be
easier to fix a sentencing-based error than an error relating to a
conviction, but it is not. After the appeals process is complete, a
federal prisoner must seek correction of the sentence through filing a
motion with the original sentencing judge under 28 U.S.C. § 2255-
the same provision used by federal prisoners trying to undo their
convictions." Historically, prisoners could utilize a separate
mechanism to correct their sentences, like Rule 35 of the Federal
13. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Search, Seizure, and Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U.
PA. L. REV. 378,383-84 (1964); Bator, supra note 12, at 451.
14. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (Supp. 2011).
15. United States v. Hadden, 475 F.3d 652,669 (4th Cir. 2007).
16. See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
17. See discussion infra Part IV.B.3.
18. § 2255(a).
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Rules of Criminal Procedure, which allowed courts to correct illegal
sentences "at any time."" After 1987, however, federal prisoners
seeking correction of their sentences have been limited to § 2255.20
Their fate became tied to federal prisoners attempting to vacate their
convictions and also linked in large part to the fate of state prisoners
petitioning for habeas relief under § 2254.21 Thus, although
sentencing-based claims are distinct in many ways, they were grouped
under the "collateral review" umbrella.
During the last few decades, the Supreme Court and Congress
have placed great restrictions on the availability of collateral relief.22
Although comity and federalism concerns are absent when federal
prisoners seek collateral review in federal court under § 2255, federal
prisoners today nonetheless face many of the same hurdles to relief as
state prisoners asking for federal relief.2 Moreover, even though the
arguments favoring finality of sentences are relatively weak, prisoners
seeking correction of sentencing errors are subject to the same
procedural barriers to collateral relief as prisoners trying to vacate
their convictions. Indeed, in some instances, lower courts are now
placing even greater limitations on sentencing relief.24
As a result of several recent Supreme Court decisions, a new
type of sentencing error is now being litigated on collateral review in
the federal courts. Lower court decisions addressing these claims
reveal how reluctant courts are to resentence, even when the error is
clear and undisputed and the error resulted in a much longer prison
sentence than should have been imposed.25 Courts are valuing finality
above correction of obvious and serious injustices." In its recent
decisions in Begay v. United States,27 Chambers v. United States,28 and
Johnson v. United States," the Supreme Court limited the types of
prior offenses that trigger federal recidivist sentencing enhancements
19. FED. R. CRIM. P. 35 (1946) (amended 2009).
20. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 rewrote Rule 35, and the changes became
effective in 1987. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 212, 98 Stat. 1837,
1987 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.).
21, See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006) (describing procedure for consideration of
applications for writs of habeas corpus).
22. 1 RANDY HERTZ & JAMES LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 2.4[d] (6th ed. 2011).
23. See discussion infra Part I.C.
24. See discussion infra Part II.B.
25. See discussion infra Part II.B.
26. See discussion infra Part II.B.
27. 553 U.S. 137 (2008).
28. 555 U.S. 122 (2009).
29. 130 S. Ct. 1265 (2010).
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and overturned a number of prior circuit court opinions.3 0 These
decisions addressed the scope of the ACCA, which imposes a fifteen-
year mandatory minimum sentence in gun possession cases when the
defendant has three or more qualifying prior convictions for
particular types of offenses, including "violent felon[ies].""1 Prior to
the Supreme Court decisions, circuit courts broadly interpreted
"violent felony" under the ACCA (and a similar enhancement
provision under the Sentencing Guidelines) to cover a wide range of
offenses such as drunk driving and failure to report to custody.3 2
Many individuals were sentenced to long prison terms based on these
broad and erroneous readings of the enhancement provisions.3 In
Begay, Chambers, and Johnson, the Supreme Court read the
provisions much more narrowly and revealed that many defendants
had been sentenced incorrectly under the prior circuit
interpretations.34
Around the country, federal prisoners have sought correction of
their sentences based on these new Supreme Court cases." Although
the Supreme Court and Congress have placed numerous procedural
restrictions on the availability of collateral relief for prisoners, lower
courts could nonetheless correct many of the errors revealed by
Begay, Chambers, and Johnson ("Begay-type" errors) consistent with
Supreme Court law and statutory provisions." Although some courts
have granted relief, most have denied relief on procedural grounds,
even when it is absolutely clear that the prisoner is serving a sentence
that would be erroneous if imposed today. Citing interest in the
finality of judgments, courts have denied relief on the grounds that:
Begay and its progeny are not retroactive; the claims of error are not
cognizable in § 2255 motions; prisoners procedurally defaulted their
claims; claims are barred by the statute of limitations or a ban on
successive motions; and prisoners waived their collateral attack rights
in their plea agreements.37 Two circuits have taken cases en banc and
reversed panel decisions that granted relief to prisoners raising
Begay-type claims,38 and several circuit splits have emerged on the
30. These cases are discussed further infra Part II.A.
31. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2006); Johnson, 130 S. Ct. at 1270; Chambers, 555 U.S. at
123; Begay, 553 U.S. at 139.
32. See infra notes 126, 137 and accompanying text.
33. See discussion infra Part 1I.B.
34. Johnson, 130 S. Ct. at 1270; Chambers, 555 U.S. at 123; Begay, 553 U.S. at 139.
35. See discussion infra Part II.B.
36. See discussion infra Part III.
37. See discussion infra Part II.B.
38. Sun Bear v. United States (Sun Bear IV), 644 F.3d 700, 705 (8th Cir. 2011) (en
85
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scope of the procedural obstacles to relief.3 9 Yet with the exception of
several short discussions by dissenting judges,40 courts have not
reflected at all on the different finality issues at stake when a prisoner
merely seeks a corrected sentence rather than a new trial.
The aftermath of Begay in lower courts reveals the great
emphasis that courts place on finality when reviewing claims of
sentencing errors at the collateral review stage. These concerns are
overstated, particularly with respect to claims like those arising under
Begay. Begay-type sentencing claims are easy to resolve, and the
errors are quick to fix.
So why are courts reluctant to correct these sentencing errors?
As a practical matter, federal judges today are rarely required to
reconsider their sentencing decisions. Out of all the offenders
sentenced in the federal system, less than one percent return to the
sentencing court after an appeal. 4 1 Although there are several other
bane); Gilbert v. United States, 640 F.3d 1293, 1324 (11th Cir. 2011) (en bane).
39. For example, there is a circuit split on whether a prisoner's claim that he or she
was improperly sentenced as a career offender under the Guidelines is cognizable under
§ 2255. Compare Narvaez v. United States, 674 F.3d 621, 627 (7th Cir. 2011) (recognizing a
career offender Sentencing Guideline error is cognizable on collateral review where a
postconviction clarification in the law renders the sentencing court's decision unlawful),
with Sun Bear IV, 644 F.3d at 706 (holding that defendant's collateral attack to his
sentence under career offender Guideline was not cognizable). The circuits disagree as to
whether prisoners erroneously sentenced under the ACCA who have used up their one
shot under § 2255 can seek relief under § 2241 pursuant to the "savings clause." Compare
Jones v. Castillo, No. 10-5376, 2012 WL 2947933, at *1 (6th Cir. July 20,2012) (per curiam)
(affirming denial of § 2241 relief by stating that "[cilaims alleging 'actual innocence' of a
sentencing enhancement cannot be raised under § 2241"), with Chaplin v. Hickey, 458 F.
App'x 827, 1 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (vacating district court order dismissing habeas
petition under § 2241 for failing to state a claim). In addition, the circuits are split on
whether the "actual innocence" exception to procedural default applies in the context of
noncapital sentencing enhancements-in other words, whether you can be "actually
innocent" of a sentencing enhancement. Compare Spence v. Superintendent, Great
Meadow Corr. Facility, 219 F.3d 162, 171 (2d Cir. 2000) ("[Tjhere is no reason why the
actual innocence exception should not apply to noncapital sentencing procedures."), with
Embrey v. Hershberger, 131 F.3d 739, 740-41 (8th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (holding that the
"actual innocence" exception "applies only to the sentencing phase of death cases" and
not to noncapital sentencing claims). Finally, the circuits also disagree on whether "actual
innocence" can excuse or equitably toll the statute of limitations for § 2255 motions.
Compare Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 931 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (holding that a
credible showing of "actual innocence" excuses the statute of limitations period
established by AEDPA), with Cousin v. Lensing, 310 F.3d 843, 849 (5th Cir. 2002)
(holding that claims of "actual innocence" do not preclude the dismissal of habeas petition
as untimely).
40. See infra notes 191-95,297-304 and accompanying text.
41. From March 2009 to March 2010,88,973 defendants were convicted and sentenced
in federal courts. Out of this number, only 757 (or 0.85%) returned to the sentencing court
after an appeal. See infra note 478.
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mechanisms that allow a court to modify a sentence, these
mechanisms are narrowly circumscribed and rarely used.42 A judge
who has little experience in reconsidering prison sentences may be
simply reluctant to do so, even when faced with compelling
circumstances and a plain error.
The lack of judicial experience with resentencing is a relatively
recent phenomenon. At common law and under the original Rule 35,
sentencing judges had the authority to revise a sentence within a
period of time after it was imposed for any reason,4 3 including simply
"a change of heart."" The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 ("SRA")
eliminated this change-of-heart discretion and also eliminated the
court's ability to correct an illegal sentence "at any time." 45 Thus,
historically, a federal judge enjoyed more discretion to reconsider a
criminal sentence and may have been less inclined to elevate finality
over the other goals of criminal sentencing.
The reluctance to resentence may also relate to concerns about
workloads and the value placed on decisiveness in judging.
Reconsidering sentences takes time away from other pressing
matters, and second-guessing one's past decisions is generally
disfavored. 46 Accordingly, while judges frequently cite society's
interest in finality when denying requests for resentencing, the
reluctance to resentence may also be explained by these other
considerations.'
Although finality of criminal sentences may provide some
benefits for society, finality certainly imposes costs. There are the
obvious costs: first, to the prisoner who is serving more time than he
or she should under the relevant sentencing laws, and second, to the
state for the fiscal cost of continuing to incarcerate the prisoner. But
broader questions about the legitimacy of the system are also raised
when the system does not correct clear injustices that are easy to fix.
There is particular cause for concern when the error relates to
provisions that have a disproportionate impact on minority offenders,
42. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
43. FED. R. CRIM. P. 35 & advisory committee's note (1944) (amended 2009); Andrew
P. Rittenberg, Comment, "Imposing" a Sentence Under Rule 35(c), 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 285,
289-90 (1998).
44. United States v. Abreu-Cabrera, 64 F.3d 67,72 (2d Cir. 1995).
45. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 212, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.) (amending Rule 35
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure).
46. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
47. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
87
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
such as recidivist sentencing enhancements.48 Failing to fix these
injustices undermines public confidence in the justice system, fosters a
sense that the system is unfair, and can ultimately diminish the
deterrent effect of the criminal law.49
Given the backdrop of extensive Begay-related litigation in the
lower courts and the possibility that the Supreme Court will need to
resolve divergent circuit decisions on these issues, now is an
important moment to consider whether interests in finality should
carry as much weight when a court reviews a sentence rather than a
conviction in a collateral proceeding. Lower courts should correct
sentencing errors in many more cases on collateral review, and they
can do so consistent with Supreme Court jurisprudence and the
governing statutory provisions. However, given the divergent
opinions that are developing in the lower courts, the Supreme Court
should clarify the scope of collateral review of federal sentencing
errors and distinguish the very different finality issues at stake with
requests for resentencing in noncapital cases. At the very least, the
Court should make it clear that lower courts can correct sentencing
errors on collateral review when a court decision's clarification of the
scope of a sentencing provision reveals that a sentence is longer than
it should be under the proper interpretation of the law. In addition,
Congress should amend the relevant statutes to explicitly provide that
courts have the power to correct sentences in these circumstances.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I discusses the historical
power of federal courts to revisit sentences and the current
procedural barriers that exist to adjudication of claims of sentencing
errors on the merits after the appellate review period is complete.
Part II considers the Supreme Court's recent decisions in Begay,
Chambers, and Johnson, and the challenges that prisoners have faced
in fixing their sentences based on these cases, even when the errors in
their sentences are undisputed. Part III reveals how courts could,
consistent with statutory restrictions and Supreme Court
jurisprudence, nonetheless correct many Begay-type claims. Part IV
examines the finality interests at stake regarding sentencing and
concludes that arguments favoring finality are considerably weaker in
the context of requests for sentence correction as compared to
48. See infra note 503 and accompanying text.
49. See discussion infra Part IV.D; see also Jeffrey Fagan & Tracey L. Meares,
Punishment, Deterrence and Social Control: The Paradox of Punishment in Minority
Communities, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 173, 176-77 (2008) (suggesting that a high
incarceration rate can undermine the legitimacy of the criminal justice system and
undermine the deterrence effect of criminal sanctions).
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requests to vacate convictions. The Article concludes by arguing that
lower courts should correct sentencing errors in many more cases,
and the Supreme Court and Congress should make explicit the
authority of sentencing courts to fix more of their mistakes.
I. CORRECTION OF SENTENCING ERRORS: ITS HISTORY AND THE
PRESENT
Today, 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is the primary mechanism for a federal
prisoner to obtain review of his or her sentence after the period of
direct review is complete. Federal prisoners must use the same
provision regardless of whether they are challenging their sentences
or their convictions. Historically, Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure existed as a separate mechanism for challenging
illegal sentences."
There are a range of types of sentencing claims that a prisoner
might seek to raise at the collateral review stage. One category of
claims relates to "procedural" errors. For example, a prisoner might
claim that the sentencing court failed to give him an opportunity to
allocute at sentencing as the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
require, or that the court conducted the sentencing proceeding in a
manner that violated his due process rights."1 Another category of
claims relates to "substantive" errors, such as where a prisoner asserts
that the sentencing court enhanced his sentence based on an
erroneous interpretation of a statute52 or imposed a sentence that was
excessively harsh under the Eighth Amendment." Finally, some
prisoners raise claims on collateral review that their attorneys
provided ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing or on direct
appeal."
The discussion below explores the historical power of courts to
correct sentencing errors and details the major barriers to relief for
federal prisoners seeking resentencing.
A. Correction of Sentences Through Appellate Review
Historically, appellate courts had little involvement in reviewing
sentences. Federal district judges had wide discretion to determine a
sentence within broad statutory ranges set by Congress. Before 1889,
50. Rittenberg, supra note 43, at 288-89.
51. See, e.g., Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424,424 (1962).
52. See, e.g., Narvarez v. United States, 674 F.3d 621, 621 (7th Cir. 2011).
53. Orvitz v. United States, 664 F.3d 1151, 1151-52 (8th Cir. 2011).
54. Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 198 (2011).
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there was effectively no appellate review at all in federal criminal
cases." By the early twentieth century, rehabilitation became the
primary penal philosophy. In this indeterminate sentencing regime,
sentencing judges examined the individual circumstances of each
offense and offender and were viewed as the sentencing experts.s"
During this era, there was no substantive appellate review of
sentences that were within statutory limits; appellate courts could
vacate sentences only in limited circumstances." The Parole
Commission played a major role in determining the length of an
offender's sentence, as federal prisoners became eligible for parole
after serving only one-third of their sentence, or even earlier at the
discretion of the sentencing judge."
In the 1970s, concerns about unwarranted disparities in sentences
began to grow, and many argued that judicial discretion in sentencing
should be constrained. 9 Congress responded with the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984, which created the United States Sentencing
Commission and abolished parole.' Under the new "truth in
sentencing" regime, offenders had to serve at least eighty-five percent
of their sentences." The Commission wrote the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, which came into effect in 1987 and greatly limited
sentencing discretion.62 The Guidelines provided sentencing ranges
based on circumstances relating to the offense and the defendant's
prior criminal convictions; they left room for departures from these
ranges only in narrowly specified circumstances.63 The courts viewed
the Sentencing Guidelines as mandatory." With the introduction of
the Guidelines came more sentencing law and an increased
involvement by the appellate courts in sentencing decisions. Under
the SRA, appellate courts had the power to review misapplications of
the Guidelines, and correct sentences that departed from the
55. See Bator, supra note 12, at 473 n.75.
56. Nancy Gertner, A Short History of American Sentencing: Too Little Law, Too
Much Law, or Just Right, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 691, 695-97 (2010).
57. 6 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 26.3(g) (3d ed. 2007).
58. PETER B. HOFFMAN, HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL PAROLE SYSTEM 11, 15 (2003).
59. MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 49 (1973);
KATE STITH & Josi A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN
THE FEDERAL COURTS 31-32 (1998).
60. Pub. L. No. 98-473, H§ 217-218,98 Stat. 1837,2017,2027 (1984).
61. Paul H. Robinson, One Perspective on Sentencing Reform in the United States, 1
CRIM. L.F. 1, 10 (1997).
62. Gertner, supra note 56, at 702.
63, U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1.1 (1987).
64. Gertner, supra note 56, at 703-04.
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applicable range.65
In 2005, the Supreme Court held in United States v. Booker66 that
a mandatory Guideline regime violated the defendant's right to a jury
trial under the Sixth Amendment and declared the Guidelines
advisory.67 Nevertheless, the Guidelines continue to have a major
impact on sentences. In determining an appropriate sentence, the
federal sentencing court must calculate the applicable Sentencing
Guideline range and consider that range along with various statutory
factors. Ultimately, judges must impose a sentence that is sufficient,
but not greater than necessary, to serve the purposes of sentencing. 6 9
Appellate court review is for the "reasonableness" of the sentence.
Miscalculation of the applicable Sentencing Guideline range or
misunderstanding of applicable statutory sentencing provisions will
usually result in a remand by the appellate court." Despite the
flexibility that Booker provides to sentencing courts, courts continue
to impose sentences within the Guideline ranges in the majority of
cases.71
Although appellate review provides an opportunity to correct
many sentencing errors, it is inadequate to address some situations.
Criminal defendants must file a notice of appeal within fourteen days
of the entry of judgment.72 In some instances, however, the sentencing
error does not become apparent until after the period of direct review
is complete because of new case law developments, the discovery of
new evidence, or ineffective counsel. As discussed below, prisoners
face major hurdles in obtaining relief from sentencing errors after
direct review has been exhausted, even if a sentence is undisputedly
incorrect.
B. Common Law Correction of Sentences and Rule 35
Prior to the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure in 1946, federal district courts had broad common law
65. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 213(a), 98 Stat. 1837, 2011
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (1984)).
66. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
67. Id. at 245.
68. Id. at 245-46.
69. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006); Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 90-91 (2007).
70. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).
71. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2011 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS 4 tbl. N (2011) (stating that 54% of sentences imposed are within Guideline
ranges; non-government supported below-range sentences account for only 17.4% of
sentences).
72. FED. R. APP. P. 4(b)(1)(A).
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authority to correct an illegal sentence at any time." Courts also had
the power to reconsider the appropriateness of the original sentence
in light of additional information or simply a change of heart.74 This
power to revise a lawful sentence was constrained only by the "term
of court rule," which allowed the court to change the sentence only
up until the end of the court's term.
Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure "continue[d]
existing law"76 by providing that a "court may correct an illegal
sentence at any time."77 Under that Rule, courts could continue to
reduce lawful sentences based on further reflection and change of
heart, but had to make any such reduction within sixty days.
Subsequent amendments to the Rule further increased the flexibility
of courts to reduce sentences. 79 During this era of wide discretion for
trial courts under Rule 35, appellate courts reviewed a court's
decision on a motion to correct an illegal sentence only for abuse of
discretion.8o
In 1984, the SRA dramatically changed this landscape and
shifted sentencing authority away from district court judges in
multiple ways." As described above, the SRA created a sentencing
Guideline regime, which constrained district court Sentencing
discretion and increased appellate review of sentences. In addition,
the SRA completely rewrote Rule 35. Under the older version of
73. Rittenberg, supra note 43, at 290.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 289.
76. FED. R. CRIM. P. 35 advisory committee's note (1946).
77. FED. R. CRIM. P. 35 (1946) (amended 2009).
78. See, e.g., id. (stating that the time limitation for motion for sentence reduction in
Rule 35 was sixty days); United States v. Maynard, 485 F.2d 247, 248 (9th Cir. 1973)
(stating that "the function of Rule 35 is simply to allow the district court to decide if, on
further reflection, the original sentence now seems unduly harsh"); United States v.
Ellenbogen, 390 F.2d 537, 543 (2d Cir. 1968) ("The motion to reduce a sentence is
'essentially a plea for leniency,' Rule 35 is intended to give every convicted defendant a
second round before the sentencing judge, and at the same time, it affords the judge an
opportunity to reconsider the sentence in the light of any further information about the
defendant or the case which may have been presented to him in the interim." (citation
omitted)).
79. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 35 advisory committee's note (1982) (clarifying the time for
modifying sentences after revocation of probation); FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(b) (1979)
(amended 2009) (clarifying that courts can change sentences from incarceration to
probation); FED. R. CRIM. P. 35 (1966) (amended 2009) (extending the time for modifying
a sentence from sixty days to 120 days and providing that courts can modify sentences
imposed in an "illegal manner").
80. 3 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & SARAH N, WELLING, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 616 (4th ed. 2011).
81. Gertner, supra note 56, at 702.
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Rule 35, district courts were specifically authorized to modify lawful
sentences.' The revised Rule, which became effective in 1987,
eliminated this explicit authorization and created only two
exceptions: (1) the court could reduce the sentence when the case was
remanded after appeal, or (2) the court could reduce the sentence
within one year if the government moved for reduction based on the
defendant's substantial assistance in the investigation of others.' The
1987 version of Rule 35 contained no provision at all permitting
sentencing courts to correct illegal sentences. Thus, as a result of the
SRA, sentencing judges became constrained in their initial sentencing
decisions by the Guidelines and lost most of their former ability to
modify sentences that they imposed.
Following the 1987 changes to Rule 35, several circuits held that
district courts retained inherent power to correct clear errors within
the time permitted for the parties to appeal." In response, Rule 35
was amended again in 1991 to allow courts to correct sentences within
seven days based on "arithmetical, technical, or other clear error.", 5
The Advisory Committee explained that the authority was intended
to be "very narrow" and not intended to "afford the court the
opportunity to reconsider the application or interpretation of the
Sentencing Guidelines or for the court simply to change its mind
about the appropriateness of the sentence."" The Advisory
Committee also clarified that the revision was "not intended to
preclude a defendant from obtaining statutory relief from a plainly
illegal sentence" because "the Committee's assumption [was] that a
defendant detained pursuant to such a sentence could seek relief
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 if the seven-day period provided in Rule 35(c)
ha[d] elapsed." 7 The current version of Rule 35 now provides that
courts may correct clear errors within fourteen days, and may, subject
to various time restraints, reduce a sentence upon a substantial
assistance motion from the government.8
As will be discussed, in the past few decades, courts and
Congress have greatly restricted a prisoner's ability to use § 2255 to
82. FED. R. CRIM. P. 35 (1983) (amended 2009); Rittenberg, supra note 43, at 290.
83. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 215, 98 Stat. 1837, 2015-16;
FED. R. CRIM. P. 35 (1987) (amended 2009).
84. United States v. Rico, 902 F.2d 1065, 1069 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Cook,
890 F.2d 672, 675 (4th Cir. 1989),
85. FED. R. CRIM. P. 35 (1991) (amended 2009).
86. FED. R. CRIM. P. 35 advisory committee's note (1991).
87. Id.
88. FED. R. CRIM. P. 35.
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correct an unlawful sentence. Eliminating Rule 35 as a separate
mechanism for resentencing meant putting sentence-based claims
under the same collateral review framework as conviction-based
claims. Since this change, little attention has been paid to the very
different finality issues at stake with these two types of claims.
C. Evolution of Habeas Corpus and § 2255 for Federal Prisoners
In 1948, two years after Rule 35 became effective, Congress
enacted 28 U.S.C. § 2255.11 For a period of time, there was some
overlap between Rule 35 and § 2255.' Historically, § 2255 provided a
means for collateral attack on a conviction or sentence, whereas Rule
35 applied only to attacks on sentences imposed based on valid
convictions.9 As described above, Rule 35 has now been virtually
eliminated as a means for challenging unlawful sentences."
Prior to the enactment of § 2255, federal prisoners could
challenge their convictions and sentences with habeas corpus
petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.93 The First Judiciary Act of 1789
gave federal prisoners the right to petition for writs of habeas corpus
to review "the cause of confinement," 4 and the Act of February 5,
1867 extended the writ to all state prisoners as well.95 Notably,
although courts originally had a very narrow view regarding the scope
of habeas review, several early decisions recognized the cognizability
of claims of illegal sentences.9 6
89. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 869, 967 (codified as amended in 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 (2006)).
90. § 2255 advisory committee's note (1976) ("The [Rule 35] remedy should be used,
rather than a motion under these § 2255 rules, whenever applicable, but there is some
overlap between the two proceedings which has caused the courts difficulty."). The
Committee stated that "[a] major difficulty in deciding whether Rule 35 or § 2255 is the
proper remedy is the uncertainty as to what is meant by an 'illegal sentence' under Rule
35." Id. The Committee stated that "[t]he movant should not be barred from an
appropriate remedy because he misstyled his motion," and after discussing a number of
cases, the Committee concluded that "[t]he flexible approach taken by the courts in the
above cases seems to be the reasonable way to handle these situations in which Rule 35
and § 2255 appear to overlap." Id.
91. 3 WRIGHT & WELLING, supra note 80, § 612.
92. See supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text.
93. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 & reviser's note (1948) (amended 2008) (clarifying that
§ 2255 provides the remedy for correcting erroneous sentences, "without resort to habeas
corpus").
94. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82; 1 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note
22, § 2.4[d][i].
95. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385, 385.
96. See, e.g., Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 418 (1885); Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18
Wall.) 163, 163 (1873); Bator, supra note 12, at 471-72.
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Section 2255 was enacted in 1948 for procedural reasons and was
not intended to change the substantive rights of federal prisoners to
seek habeas review.97 With the same legislation in 1948, Congress
created § 2254 for state prisoners to utilize in seeking relief from
federal courts.98 Although § 2255 for the most part replaced § 2241
(the former habeas corpus provision) with respect to claims by federal
prisoners, prisoners may continue to utilize § 2241 if the attack relates
to the execution rather than the imposition of a federal sentence" or
where § 2255 is "inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of [the
prisoner's] detention.""' This "inadequate or ineffective" provision,
called the "savings clause," operates to "save" the restrictions
imposed under § 2255 from violating the Suspension Clause of the
Constitution.
After its enactment in 1948, § 2255 was not amended in any
significant way for almost fifty years. The scope of § 2255 nonetheless
evolved over the years through case law developments. Following
World War II, the Supreme Court began to dramatically expand the
scope of federal habeas review of state and federal judgments. Under
the Warren Court, Supreme Court cases established that state
prisoners could re-litigate constitutional issues in federal court
through habeas corpus petitions,o'0 and prisoners would be prevented
from raising claims not raised in the state only if they deliberately
bypassed state procedures."02 However, by the mid-1970s, the Burger
Court began to emphasize principles of finality of criminal judgments
and narrow the scope of habeas relief. The Court barred
97. Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 427 (1962) (quoting United States v. Hayman,
342 U.S. 205, 219 (1951)); see also 2 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 22, § 41.2[a], at 2130-
31. Because § 2241 petitions had to be brought in the district of confinement, those courts
sitting in jurisdictions containing federal prisons had a disproportionate number of
petitions. Id. In addition, they had to rely on records stored at distant sentencing courts,
and hearings could require witnesses to be brought from faraway places. Id. To address
these concerns, under § 2255 the prisoner files the motion with the original sentencing
judge rather than in the district of confinement. Id. at 2131. The legislative history of
§ 2255 suggests that Congress viewed the motion as a further step in the criminal case,
rather than a new civil action. S. REP. No. 80-1526, at 2 (1948). In the Habeas Rules,
promulgated in 1976, the Advisory Committee stated that "a motion under § 2255 is a
further step in the movant's criminal case rather than a separate civil action." 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 advisory committee's note (1976).
98. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 869, 967 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 (2006)).
99. Examples include challenges to denial of good time credits, prison disciplinary
procedures, or parole determinations. 2 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 20, § 41.2[b].
100. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (2006).
101. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443,465 (1953).
102. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391,439 (1963).
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consideration of Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule claims in
habeas proceedings'03 and, regarding claims not previously raised,
replaced the deliberate-bypass standard with a stricter requirement
that prisoners show "cause" and "prejudice" for procedural default.
The Rehnquist Court further narrowed habeas relief by placing
limitations on successive petitions'I and by restricting the retroactive
application of new case law to habeas cases. 0 6
Although § 2255 and § 2254 address very different situations, the
Supreme Court has stated that "§ 2255 was intended to mirror § 2254
in operative effect." 1 Courts have read the provisions together, and
thus most of the judicially-created restrictions on habeas relief for
state prisoners, including non-retroactivity and procedural default,
have been held to limit § 2255 relief as well. 0 Courts have also
placed additional limitations on the availability of § 2255 relief
through the cognizability doctrine, which provides that non-
constitutional claims must rise to the level of a "miscarriage of
justice" in order to be cognizable at all in § 2255 proceedings. 09
In 1996, with the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
("AEDPA"), Congress greatly restricted the scope of habeas relief
for both state and federal prisoners." 0 Although the AEDPA
legislation was largely motivated by concerns about federal court
review of state criminal judgments rather than federal court review of
its own judgments,"' the statute imposes similar constraints on both
remedies. The AEDPA changed § 2255 by imposing the following: (1)
a new one-year statute of limitations period, subject to narrow
exceptions; (2) a restriction on filing second or successive petitions;
and (3) a requirement that the prisoner obtain a "certificate of
appealability" in order to appeal.1 2 The AEDPA placed the same
restrictions on state prisoners seeking federal relief and imposed
103. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494-95 (1976).
104. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90-91 (1977).
105. See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 469,493 (1991).
106. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288,310 (1989).
107. Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 344 (1974).
108. 3 WRIGHT & WELLING, supra note 80, § 625, at 659.
109. 2 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 22, § 41.3[b]. See infra note 169 and
accompanying text for further discussion on the meaning of "miscarriage of justice" in this
cognizability context.
110. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-132, § 101,
110 Stat. 1214, 1217 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2253-2255 (2006)).
111. Lee Kovarsky, AEDPA's Wrecks: Comity, Finality, and Federalism, 82 TUL. L.
REV. 443, 458-80 (2007).
112. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2253,2255(f), (h) (2006).
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several additional limitations on § 2254 petitions."'
Thus, federal prisoners today seeking correction of sentencing
errors at the collateral review stage face stringent statutory and judge-
made barriers to relief. It bears noting that the executive pardon or
parole systems are not used as error-correcting devices in the federal
system. Executive pardon or clemency in the federal system is granted
extremely rarely." Indeed, of the few pardons granted, many are
given after someone has been released from prison, or to someone
who was never incarcerated."' In addition, parole is not available in
the federal system." 6 Thus, unlike in some states where parole could
serve an error-correcting function, parole cannot mitigate the impact
of sentencing errors in the federal system.
Below, the Article considers the aftermath of several recent
Supreme Court cases as federal prisoners have sought collateral
review. Although the decisions established that many prisoners were
sentenced incorrectly, courts have often denied relief on procedural
grounds, citing interests in finality.
II. THE IMPACT OF NEW COURT DECISIONS ON OLD SENTENCES
When the Supreme Court decides a case involving sentencing, its
holding applies in the particular case before the Court and to any case
that is not yet "final"-meaning those cases still pending on direct
review or for which the time to seek direct review has not expired." 7
Whether prisoners already serving final sentences at the time of the
decision will obtain the benefit of the new holding is much more
113. Id. §H 2244, 2254. For example, state prisoners seeking federal habeas relief must
exhaust their claims in state court, id. § 2254(b), and relief may not be granted unless the
adjudication of the claim in the state "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by
the Supreme Court of the United States" or "resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State
court proceeding." Id. § 2254(d).
114. President Obama has granted only twenty-two pardons and one commutation
request since 2009. See Clemency Statistics, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST.,
http://www.justice.gov/pardon/statistics.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2012).
115. See Pardons Granted by President Obama, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST.,
http://www.justice.gov/pardon/obamapardon-grants.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2012); see
also President Obama Grants Pardons, THE WHITE HOUSE (May 20, 2011),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/20/president-obama-grants-pardons;
President Obama Grants Pardons and Commutation, THE WHITE HOUSE (Nov. 21,2011),
http:/www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/21/president-obama-grants-pardons-
and-commutation.
116. See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 212, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.) (abolishing parole).
117. See Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351 (2004).
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uncertain.
In considering claims of sentencing errors at the collateral review
stage, courts place a great emphasis on notions of finality. The
aftermath of several recent Supreme Court decisions in the lower
courts reveals a reluctance by courts to revisit sentences at the
collateral review stage. The Court's decisions in Begay v. United
States, Chambers v. United States, and Johnson v. United States
established that many defendants had been sentenced based on
erroneous interpretations of sentencing enhancement provisions."'
However, lower courts have refused to correct these errors in many
cases-even when it is clear on the merits that the prisoners were
sentenced improperly. In justifying these decisions, courts have relied
heavily on finality interests."' For the most part, however, they have
not carefully analyzed the actual finality interests at stake with
respect to sentencing claims.
A. Supreme Court Decisions in Begay, Chambers, and Johnson
In a series of recent decisions, the Supreme Court clarified the
types of convictions that will trigger certain types of federal
sentencing enhancements and established that most circuits had been
reading these provisions too broadly. The Court's decisions in Begay,
Chambers, and Johnson all addressed the scope of the definition of
"violent felony" in the ACCA. 2 0 Under the ACCA, a defendant
convicted of gun possession with three or more prior "violent
felonies" or "serious drug offenses" will be subject to a mandatory
minimum sentence of fifteen years' imprisonment and a maximum
sentence of life.12' A defendant without these predicate convictions is
subject to a statutory range of zero to ten years.'12 In addition to
118. See infra Part II.A.
119. The only other article to consider the impact of Begay on collateral proceedings
was published before the major circuit decisions on the issue in Sun Bear IV, 644 F.3d 700
(8th Cir. 2011) (en banc), Narvaez v. United States, 674 F.3d 621 (7th Cir. 2011), and
before the Eleventh Circuit's en banc decision in Gilbert v. United States, 640 F.3d 1293
(11th Cir. 2011) (en banc). See Douglas J. Bench, Jr., Collateral Review of Career Offender
Sentences: The Case for Coram Nobis, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 155, 182 (2011) (arguing
that courts should resurrect the ancient writ of coram nobis to grant collateral relief on
Begay claims). In contrast to Bench's article, this Article argues that lower courts can
grant relief in many cases under § 2255 and § 2241 consistent with preexisting doctrines. In
addition, the Article makes a broader argument about the very different finality interests
at play when a prisoner requests resentencing rather than retrial.
120. Johnson v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1265, 1268 (2010); Chambers v. United States,
555 U.S. 122, 124 (2009); Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 139 (2008).
121. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2006).
122. Id. § 924(a)(2). A conviction under § 924(a)(2) requires simply a showing that the
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narrowing the reach of the ACCA, these Supreme Court decisions
also applied to enhancements under the Sentencing Guidelines based
on "crimes of violence."123 Guideline-based enhancements include the
career offender provision, which can double, triple, or even quadruple
a defendant's sentence. 12 4
In Begay, the Supreme Court held that the offense of driving
under the influence of alcohol ("DUI") was not a "violent felony"
within the meaning of the ACCA. 12 Prior to Begay, the circuits that
had addressed the issue had uniformly held that DUI convictions
were ACCA predicates.126 The ACCA defines "violent felony" as
"any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one
year" that "(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person of another" or
"(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or
otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of
physical injury to another."'" In determining whether a prior offense
is a "violent felony," the Court applied a "categorical approach."' 28 In
other words, the Court examined the crime "in terms of how the law
defines the offense and not in terms of how an individual offender
might have committed it on a particular occasion."129
At issue in Begay was the meaning of subdivision (ii), the so-
called "residual clause."130 Begay clarified that the ACCA's listed
examples-burglary, extortion, arson, and crimes involving use of
explosives-"illustrate the kinds of crimes that fall within the statute's
scope," and "[t]heir presence indicates that the statute covers only
defendant was previously convicted of any felony offense prior to possessing the gun. Id.
123. Lower courts have generally held that Supreme Court decisions interpreting the
definition of the ACCA's "violent felony" provision also apply to the Sentencing
Guidelines' definition of "crime of violence." See, e.g., United States v. Mobley, 687 F.3d
625, 628 n.3 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Grupee, 682 F.3d 143, 148-49 (1st Cir. 2012);
United States v. Marrero, 677 F.3d 155, 160 n.1 (3d Cir. 2012); United States v. Meeks, 664
F.3d 1067, 1070 n.1 (6th Cir. 2011); United States v. Gray, 535 F.3d 128, 130-31 (2d Cir.
2008); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(a) (2011) (defining
"crime of violence"). But see United States v. Raupp, 677 F.3d 756, 760 (7th Cir. 2012)
(holding that the Guideline definition of "crime of violence" is somewhat broader than the
ACCA's definition).
124. § 4B1.1. "Crimes of violence" can also lead to enhancements under the Guidelines
in immigration and firearm cases. See id. §§ 2K2.1, 2L1.2.
125. Begay, 553 U.S. at 139.
126. See, e.g., United States v. McCall, 439 F.3d 967, 971-72 (8th Cir. 2006) (en banc);
United States v. Sperberg, 432 F.3d 706,708-09 (7th Cir. 2005).
127. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (2011).
128. Begay, 553 U.S. at 141.
129. Id.
130. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii); Begay, 553 U.S. at 155 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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similar crimes, rather than every crime that 'presents a serious
potential risk of physical injury to another.' "I31 The Court reasoned
that a DUI offense, unlike the enumerated offenses, did not require
"purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct." 32 Rather, DUI
offenses are comparable to strict liability offenses where criminal
intent need not be shown. The Court found this distinction relevant
because although "[iln both instances, the offender's prior crimes
reveal a degree of callousness toward risk," crimes involving
intentional or purposeful conduct "also show an increased likelihood
that the offender is the kind of person who might deliberately point
the gun and pull the trigger."" The Court concluded: "We have no
reason to believe that Congress intended a 15-year mandatory prison
term where that increased likelihood does not exist."134
Following Begay, the Court held in Chambers v. United States"'
that an escape conviction based on a failure to report to custody also
does not qualify as a violent felony under the ACCA's residual
clause.13 6 The circuits had previously split on the issue, with most
holding that this form of escape conviction triggered the ACCA
enhancement."' Soon after, in Johnson v. United States,' the
Supreme Court held that the crime of battery by offensive touching
did not qualify under subparagraph (i) of the ACCA.13 9 The Court
concluded that subparagraph (i) requires that the predicate offense's
element of "physical force" involve "violent force-that is, force
capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person." 14 0 A
number of circuits considering the issue had reached the opposite
conclusion prior to Johnson.'
Since these Supreme Court cases apply not only to
131. Begay, 553 U.S. at 142.
132. Id. at 144-45.
133. Id. at 146.
134. Id.
135. 555 U.S. 122 (2009).
136. Id. at 130.
137. Most circuits concluded that an escape conviction based on failure to return to
custody was a "violent felony" under the ACCA or a "crime of violence" under the
Guidelines. See, e.g., United States v. Winn, 364 F.3d 7, 8 (1st Cir. 2004); United States v.
Jackson, 301 F.3d 59, 63 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v. Luster, 305 F.3d 199, 202 (3d Cir.
2002). But see United States v. Piccolo, 441 F.3d 1084, 1085 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that an
escape conviction is not an offense which categorically constitutes a "crime of violence").
138. Johnson v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1265,1267 (2010).
139. Id. at 1271.
140. Id.
141. See, e.g., United States v. Llanos-Agostadero, 486 F.3d 1194, 1195 (11th Cir. 2007)
(per curiam); United States v. Nason, 269 F.3d 10, 20 (1st Cir. 2001); United States v.
Smith, 171 F.3d 617, 621 n.2 (8th Cir. 1999).
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enhancements under the ACCA but also to Guidelines
enhancements, 142 the decisions will impact a large number of cases
going forward.13 But what about the prisoners who are already
serving sentences that were imposed under an incorrect view of the
law?
B. Addressing Claims of Erroneous Enhancements on Collateral
Review
In the wake of the Supreme Court's recent decisions clarifying
the reach of statutory and Guideline enhancement provisions, a
number of federal prisoners have sought relief through filing motions
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. In most of these cases, it is undisputed that
the prisoners were sentenced incorrectly-i.e., if they were sentenced
today, their prior conviction would plainly not trigger a sentencing
enhancement, and they would receive a shorter sentence.
In light of the clear errors and the relative ease of correcting
them, one might expect prisoners to obtain relief. However, although
courts have granted resentencing in some cases, relief has been
denied in many cases. As is demonstrated below, courts have rejected
motions on the ground that Begay and its progeny are not retroactive,
that Sentencing Guidelines errors are not cognizable under § 2255,
that claims are procedurally defaulted or barred by the statute of
limitations, and that prisoners waived their right to seek collateral
review in their plea agreements.
1. Retroactivity of the Supreme Court Decisions
A threshold question is whether Begay and its progeny apply
142. See supra note 123.
143. Last term, the Court appeared to retreat somewhat from Begay with its decision in
Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267 (2011). In Sykes, the Court held that an Indiana
statute making it a criminal offense when the driver of a vehicle knowingly or intentionally
flees from a law enforcement officer was a violent felony within the meaning of the
ACCA. Id. at 2270. The Court emphasized that the DUI offense at issue in Begay did not
require a showing of deliberate and purposeful conduct. Id. at 2275. In contrast, the crime
at issue in Sykes involved intentional conduct. Id. Rather than following the "purposeful,
violent, and aggressive" formulation from Begay, the Court focused instead on whether
the crime involved a showing of criminal intent and the level of risk presented by the
offense. Id. at 2275. After Sykes, it is unclear whether Begay's "purposeful, violent, and
aggressive" test "will make a resurgence" as Justice Kagan suggests in her Sykes dissent,
or whether risky intentional crimes that are not "violent" or "aggressive" will be included
within the scope of the residual clause. Id. at 2289 n.1 (Kagan, J., dissenting). However,
after Sykes, it is still clear that crimes involving unintentional conduct do not count as
ACCA predicates. Justice Scalia dissented in Sykes, and argued that the residual clause
was void for vagueness. See id. at 2284 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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retroactively to cases on collateral review. Although it seems obvious
under Supreme Court case law that the decisions are retroactive, a
number of courts have held that Teague v. Lane" precludes relief.'4 5
Teague established a new framework for considering issues of
retroactivity and greatly narrowed the possibilities for relief for
prisoners in collateral proceedings.14 6 Teague involved a state prisoner
seeking federal review of a conviction and was motivated by concerns
about federalism, comity, and finality.147 The Supreme Court has
since held the Teague framework applicable in the capital sentencing
context,1"4 and lower courts have assumed that it applies in noncapital
sentencing cases.14 9 The Supreme Court has explicitly left open the
question of whether Teague binds federal courts when they review
federal criminal judgments in § 2255 proceedings.' Some scholars
have argued that Teague should not bar retroactive application of
new rules to federal judgments because federalism and comity
concerns are absent in the context of federal review of federal
judgments."' However, the courts of appeals to consider the issue
144. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
145. See infra note 158 and accompanying text (listing cases that have precluded relief
based on Teague).
146. In Teague, the Supreme Court held that federal courts cannot create a new rule
recognizing a constitutional right in a habeas case unless it is a right that would be applied
retroactively; "[r]etroactivity is properly treated as a threshold question." Teague, 489 U.S.
at 300. Prior to Teague, the Court considered habeas petitions alleging constitutional
violations even when the right would not be applied retroactively in other habeas cases.
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 15.5.1, at 932 (5th ed. 2007). Teague
broadly defined "new": "[A] case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by
precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final." 489 U.S. at 301.
Under Teague, rights have retroactive effect only where the new rule (1) places "certain
kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making
authority to prescribe" or (2) is a "watershed" rule of criminal procedures. Id. at 307, 311.
Teague thus greatly limited the ability of federal courts to identify and protect new
constitutional rights.
147. Teague, 489 U.S. at 305-10.
148. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351 (2004); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302,
314 (1989).
149. See, e.g., Duncan v. United States, 552 F.3d 442, 444 n.4 (6th Cir. 2009); United
States v. Cruz, 423 F.3d 1119, 1120 (9th Cir. 2005); Varela v. United States, 400 F.3d 864,
867 (11th Cir. 2005).
150. Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 269 n.4 (2008). In Danforth, the Court also
held that state courts are not bound by Teague in determining the rules governing the
retroactive application of new federal constitutional rules in state postconviction
proceedings. Id. at 269.
151. See Christopher N. Lasch, The Future of Teague Retroactivity, or "Redressability,"
After Danforth v. Minnesota: Why Lower Courts Should Give Retroactive Effect to New
Constitutional Rules of Criminal Procedure in Postconviction Proceedings, 46 AM. CRIM,
L. REV. 1, 1 (2009). For more scholarship critiquing Teague, see generally Richard H.
Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies,
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thus far have held Teague applicable to § 2255 motions. 2
Assuming that the Teague framework applies at all to § 2255
motions, the general rule is that new substantive rules apply
retroactively, whereas new procedural rules are retroactive only if the
rule is a watershed rule of criminal procedure implicating the
fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceedings. As
the Supreme Court has explained:
New substantive rules generally apply retroactively. This
includes decisions that narrow the scope of a criminal statute by
interpreting its terms, see Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614,
620-621 (1998), as well as constitutional determinations that
place particular conduct or persons covered by the statute
beyond the State's power to punish, see Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S.
484, 494-495 (1990); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989)
(plurality opinion). Such rules apply retroactively because they
'necessarily carry a significant risk that a defendant stands
convicted of 'an act that the law does not make criminal' " or
faces a punishment that the law cannot impose upon him.
Bousley, supra, at 620 (quoting Davis v. United States, 417 U.S.
333, 346 (1974)).153
Begay is a substantive decision about the scope of criminal statute. 154
With the decision, the Supreme Court held that some types of prior
convictions will trigger the ACCA penalty, and some will not."'
People sentenced under prior circuit precedent are serving sentences
"that the law cannot impose" on them under Begay's holding."15 Thus,
Teague should not prevent retroactive application of Begay. Indeed,
the government conceded the retroactivity of Begay in one of the first
decisions to address the issue.5 7
104 HARV. L. REV. 1731 (1991); James S. Liebman, More than "Slightly Retro:" The
Rehnquist Court's Rout of Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction in Teague v. Lane, 18 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & Soc. CHANGE 537 (1990-91); Linda Meyer, "Nothing We Say Matters": Teague and
New Rules, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 423 (1994); Giovanna Shay & Christopher Lasch, Initiating
a New Constitutional Dialogue: The Increased Importance Under AEDPA of Seeking
Certiorari from Judgments of State Courts, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211 (2008) (arguing
that Teague and AEDPA have effectively ended the constitutional dialogue between
lower federal courts and state courts).
152. See, e.g., United States v. Chang Hong, 671 F.3d 1147, 1150 (11th Cir. 2011);
Duncan, 552 F.3d at 444 n.2; Sepulveda v. United States, 330 F.3d 55, 66 (1st Cir. 2003).
153. Schriro, 542 U.S. at 351-52 (footnote and parallel citations omitted).
154. Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137,140(2008).
155. Id. at 142.
156. Schriro, 542 U.S. at 352.
157. See United States v. Glover, No. 05-CR-0111-CVE, No. 08-CV-0261-CVE-FHM,
2008 WL 2951085, at *4 (N.D. Okla. July 28,2008).
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Yet somewhat remarkably, district courts have been split on
whether Begay, Chambers, and Johnson are retroactive, with a large
number of district courts holding that the cases are not retroactive."'
These cases typically involved pro se prisoners, and most decisions
did not provide extensive reasoning on the retroactivity question.
Some courts simply stated that Begay "is not a substantive change in
the law, nor a watershed rule bearing on the accuracy or fairness of
the criminal process" without further analysis.'"' Several courts,
facing claims of erroneous Guideline calculations under Begay, said
that rules for calculating Sentencing Guidelines are not retroactive
and cited decisions holding that the Supreme Court's decision
rendering the Guidelines advisory in Booker v. United States is not
retroactive.16 The Booker analogy is unpersuasive: at issue in Booker
was the constitutionality of the procedures for enhancing sentences
under the Guidelines.16 ' Begay concerned the substantive scope of an
enhancement provision.1 62
The number of district courts finding that Begay and its progeny
are not retroactive is striking, given the strength of the argument that
the cases addressed a substantive issue regarding the reach of a
criminal statute. At the circuit level, the Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth
Circuits have held that Begay and/or Chambers are retroactive.163 The
158. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, Nos. 06-cr-132-jcs, 09-cv-779-bbc, 2010 WL 148397,
at *2 (W.D. Wis. Jan. 12, 2010); United States v. Jones, Criminal Action No. 6: 04-70-
DCR, Civil Action No. 6: 09-7082-DCR, 2010 WL 55930, at *3-6 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 4, 2010),
rev'd, 689 F.3d 621 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Holt, 677 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1065 (W.D.
Wis. 2009); Kirkland v. United States, Nos. 3:09-CV-335 RLM, 3:06-CR-3(01) RLM, 2009
WL 3526185, at *8 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 22, 2009), vacated, Aug. 30, 2010; United States v.
Johnson, Criminal No. 04-269 (MJDIAJB), 2009 WL 2611279, at *2 (D. Minn. Aug. 24,
2009); Lindsey v. United States, Case No. 09-0249-CV-W-ODS, Crim. No. 06-00340-01-
CR-W-ODS, 2009 WL 2337120, at *2 (W.D. Mo. July 29, 2009), aff'd on other grounds,
615 F.3d 998 (8th Cir. 2010); Sun Bear v. United States (Sun Bear II), No. CIV 08-3021,
No. CR 01-30051, 2009 WL 2033028, at *4 (D.S.D. July 9, 2009), rev'd, 611 F.3d 925 (8th
Cir. 2010), affd en banc, 644 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2011); United States v. Narvaez, No. 09-cv-
222-bbc, No. 03-cr-0081-jes-01, 2009 WL 1351811, at *2 (W.D. Wis. May 12, 2009), rev'd,
641 F.3d 877 (7th Cir. 2011); Cadieux v. United States, Civil No. 09-42-B-W, Crim. No. 03-
41-B-W, 2009 WL 1286421, at *7 (D. Me. May 8, 2009); United States v. Campbell, CR
No. 6:06-812-HMH, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37542, at *4 (D.S.C. May 1, 2009).
159. Johnson, 2009 WL 2611279, at *4.
160. See, e.g., Holt, 677 F. Supp. 2d at 1065; see also Jones, 2010 WL 55930, at *3-6
(discussing the 6th Circuit, Wisconsin district court, and Maine district court decisions not
to apply Begay retroactively).
161. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 220 (2005).
162. See Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 137-38 (2008).
163. See Jones v. United States, 689 F.3d 621, 625 (6th Cir. 2012) ("Begay is a new
substantive rule and not procedural because it substantially altered the punishment certain
categories of defendants may face for a crime."); Narvaez v. United States, 674 F.3d 621,
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Eighth and Eleventh Circuit decisions initially held that Begay was
retroactive, but subsequently vacated the panel decisions and issued
en banc decisions that denied relief without reaching the retroactivity
question.'" The Fourth Circuit, while not explicitly ruling on the
issue, ordered a resentencing based on Chambers in a case on
collateral review.16 s The First Circuit stated in dicta that Begay is not
retroactive.16
2. Cognizability of Claims
In addition to holding that Begay and its progeny are not
retroactive, some courts have denied relief to prisoners on the ground
that the claims are not "cognizable" in § 2255 motions. In other
words, courts have held that § 2255 simply does not provide a remedy
for the claimed sentencing error.167
Under § 2255, a federal prisoner may move the court to "vacate,
set aside or correct the sentence" if the "sentence was imposed in
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the
court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the
sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is
otherwise subject to collateral attack.""6 s The Supreme Court has held
that for errors that are non-constitutional to be cognizable, the error
must be "a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete
625 (7th Cir. 2011) ("We also agree that, in these circumstances, the Begay and Chambers
decisions apply retroactively on collateral review."); United States v. Shipp, 589 F.3d 1084,
1089-91 (10th Cir. 2009) ("[W]e hold that the Supreme Court's construction of the ACCA
in Chambers applies retroactively to Mr. Shipp on collateral review.").
164. See Sun Bear v. United States (Sun Bear Ill), 611 F.3d 925, 929 (8th Cir. 2010)
("[Wle hold that the rule in Begay is applicable retroactively to cases on collateral
review."), vacated en banc, Sun Bear IV, 644 F.3d 700, 703-04 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc)
("We decline to consider these [retroactivity] issues because we agree with the
government's alternative contention that Sun Bear's collateral attack on an application of
the career offender guidelines provisions is not cognizable under § 2255."); Gilbert v.
United States, 609 F.3d 1159, 1165 (11th Cir. 2010) ("[T]he government ... concedes that
Begay. .. appl[ies] retroactively .... We agree."), vacated en banc, 640 F.3d 1293, 1323
(11th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (holding that "the savings clause does not authorize a federal
prisoner to bring in a § 2241 petition a claim, which would otherwise be barred by
§ 2255(h), that the Sentencing Guidelines were misapplied in a way that resulted in a
longer sentence not exceeding the statutory maximum").
165. See United States v. Williams, 396 F. App'x 951, 952 (4th Cir. 2010).
166. See United States v. Giggey, 551 F.3d 27, 36 n.3 (1st Cir. 2008).
167. See, e.g., Crawford v. United States, No. 8:11-cv-1866-T-30TGW, No. 8:07-cr-
454-T-30TGW, 2011 WL 3702664, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 23, 2011); Sun Bear IV, 644 F.3d
at 703-04; United States v. Smith, Criminal No. 3:06-1126-CMC, 2010 WL 4340340, at *3
(D.S.C. Oct. 25, 2010); Eason v. United States, No. 09-80172-CIV, 2010 WL 1645092, at *7
(S.D. Fla. Apr. 21, 2010) (rejecting magistrate judge's recommendation).
168. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (Supp. IV 2011).
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miscarriage of justice" or "an omission inconsistent with the
rudimentary demands of fair procedure."1 69
Courts seem to agree that claims by prisoners that their
sentences were imposed in excess of the statutory maximum are
cognizable in § 2255 motions."o Thus, claims are cognizable if they
allege that a conviction should not have triggered the ACCA
enhancement under Begay-as the ACCA requires imposition of a
sentence above the otherwise applicable statutory maximum."'
Courts disagree, however, on whether sentences may be challenged
on collateral review if they were imposed based on erroneous
calculations under the Sentencing Guidelines, but do not exceed the
maximum permitted by statute. There is a circuit split as to whether a
prisoner's claim that he or she was incorrectly sentenced as a career
offender under the Guidelines is cognizable in a § 2255 motion. The
Eighth Circuit, sitting en banc, held in Sun Bear v. United States...
that such Guidelines-based claims are not cognizable."' The Seventh
Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in Narvaez v. United States, 174
holding that imposition of an erroneous career offender sentence is a
miscarriage of justice and cognizable in a § 2255 motion.7 5
a. Sun Bear v. United States
In 2002, the district court in Sun Bear sentenced the defendant in
to 360 months' imprisonment under the then-mandatory Sentencing
Guidelines after finding that he qualified as a career offender based
169. United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 185 (1979) (noting that errors of law do
not support collateral attack claims unless the "error constituted 'a fundamental defect
which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice'" (quoting Hill v. United
States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962)); 2 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 22, § 41.3[b]
(describing cognizable claims and noting that when "the conviction or sentence violates
other federal law. . . for is] otherwise open to collateral attack because it results in a
fundamental miscarriage of justice," such errors must "amount to a violation of the
Constitution, or a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage
of justice, or an omission inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure"
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
170. Courts have granted resentencings in these situations where no other procedural
barriers exist. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 689 F.3d 621, 627-28 (6th Cir. 2012); Welch
v. United States, 604 F.3d 408, 412-13 (7th Cir. 2010); Williams, 396 F. App'x at 953 (4th
Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
171. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2), (e) (2006). Of course, courts would only grant relief if
they also found Begay retroactive, and found no other procedural barrier to relief.
172. 644 F.3d 700.
173. Id. at 704.
174. 674 F.3d 621 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
175. Id. at 623.
106 [Vol. 91
2012] CORRECTION OF SENTENCING ERRORS 107
on his prior convictions.'76 The defendant appealed, challenging his
career offender designation, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed.177 In
2008, Sun Bear filed a § 2255 motion arguing that under Begay, his
sentence was unlawful because his prior conviction for attempted
auto theft was not a "crime of violence" under the career offender
Guidelines. 78 Following Begay, the Eighth Circuit had held that auto
theft was not a crime of violence,"' and thus it was undisputed that
Sun Bear would not be a career offender if sentenced today.
Nevertheless, the district court found the motion time-barred,
concluding that the statute of limitations did not restart under
§ 2255(f)(3) because Begay was not retroactive. 80 On appeal, a panel
of the Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that Begay announced a
substantive rule that retroactively applies to career offender decisions
under the Guidelines."' In response to the government's claim that
the error was not cognizable, the panel reasoned that "Sun Bear's
claim [was] more than a run-of-the-mill claim that the district court
misapplied the Sentencing Guidelines." 8 2 Instead the case "[was]
based on a post-conviction change in the law that render[ed] unlawful
the district court's sentencing determination."' Since there was no
indication that the district court would have imposed the same
sentence absent the error, the panel concluded that a miscarriage of
justice had occurred and resentencing was warranted."
176. United States v. Sun Bear (Sun Bear 1), 307 F.3d 747, 753 (8th Cir. 2002). The
district court calculated a Sentencing Guideline range of 360 months to life. Id. Under the
Sentencing Guidelines, a sentencing range is calculated by determining the "offense level"
and the "criminal history category." U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 111.1
(2011). The probation office calculated Sun Bear's offense level as 32, and his criminal
history category was VI. Id. Thus, without application of the career offender Guideline or
any departure, his Guideline range was 210 to 262 months' imprisonment. Sun Bear 1, 307
F.3d at 750. However, the district court found that the career offender provision applied,
and also departed upward by three levels on the ground that criminal category VI
understated Sun Bear's criminal history. Id. Had the district court only departed, and not
applied the career offender enhancement, the range would have been 292 to 365 months'
imprisonment. See Sun Bear IV, 644 F.3d at 705.
177. Sun Bear I, 307 F.3d at 753.
178. Sun Bear II, No. CIV 08-3021, No. CR 01-30051, 2009 WL 2033028, at *3 (D.S.D.
July 9, 2009), rev'd, 611 F.3d 925 (8th Cir. 2010), aff'd en banc, 644 F.3d 700.
179. See United States v. Williams, 537 F.3d 969, 975-76 (8th Cir. 2008).
180. Sun Bear II, 2009 WL 2033028, at *4.
181. Sun Bear III, 611 F.3d at 929.
182. Id. at 930.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 931-32 ("The district court has had two opportunities to state that an error
in applying the career offender Guideline would not have impacted its sentencing
determination, and yet has not done so. In these circumstances, we are unable to say Sun
Bear's sentence was inevitable. Accordingly, we hold that Sun Bear has raised a
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Sitting en banc, and in a split six to five decision, the Eighth
Circuit vacated the panel decision and affirmed the district court's
dismissal of the § 2255 motion.18 Without reaching the retroactivity
question, the court held that Sun Bear's claim that he had been
sentenced erroneously under the career offender Guideline was
simply not cognizable under § 2255.1'6 The court noted that "this
court and our sister circuits have consistently held that ordinary
questions of Guideline interpretation falling short of the miscarriage
of justice standard do not present a proper § 2255 claim.""' The
Court rejected the panel's conclusion that the miscarriage-of-justice
exception applied because Sun Bear's claim was based on a post-
conviction change in the law that rendered unlawful the district
court's sentencing decision.' 8 The en banc court stated: "Sun Bear's
360-month sentence is not unlawful. An unlawful or illegal sentence is
one imposed without, or in excess of, statutory authority."" Since
"the same 360-month sentence could be reimposed were Sun Bear
granted the § 2255 relief he request[ed]," the court concluded that
"no miscarriage of justice [was] at issue."190
Five judges dissented, arguing that the "majority's holding
promotes finality at the expense of justice in a situation where, unlike
most AEDPA cases, there [were] no concerns of comity or
federalism."' 9' Writing for the dissent, Judge Melloy stated: "I find
the sole justification for the majority's holding today to be an
uncompelling and unjust denial of process resting on hollow claims of
a need to promote finality."l" In response to the government's
presentation of "a parade of horribles suggesting there will be an
overwhelming burden caused by the application of Section 2255 in
this context," the dissent responded: "This alarmist argument is
wholly without merit given the limitation of the facts of the present
case: fully preserved error in the context of new Supreme Court
authority issued with retroactive effect as applied in a case that
cognizable claim for relief under § 2255.").
185. See Sun Bear IV, 644 F.3d 700,706 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
186. Id. at 705 ("[Tlhe panel concluded that the miscarriage-of-justice exception
applies because Sun Bear's claim is based on a post-conviction change in the law that
renders unlawful the district court's sentencing determination .... We disagree." (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
187. Id. at 704 (internal quotation marks omitted).
188. See id. at 705.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 707 (Melloy, J., dissenting).
192. Id. at 712.
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cannot pass a harmless error inquiry."" The dissent continued:
"[T]he government's argument suggests that keeping court dockets
clear is more important than the liberty of those prisoners who
potentially should not be serving career-offender sentences."194
However, the dissent reasoned that "[e]ven if there were merit to the
government's assertions, resentencings pursuant to recent guideline
amendments ha[d] shown the courts' ability to efficiently process
sentencing adjustments en mass."19
b. Narvaez v. United States
In Narvaez v. United States, the Seventh Circuit reached the
opposite conclusion from the Eighth Circuit and reversed the district
court's decision denying the defendant relief on his § 2255 motion."6
Narvaez had pleaded guilty to bank robbery and was sentenced in
2003 as a career offender based on his two prior escape convictions
involving failure to return to confinement. At the time of the
sentencing, the Guidelines were mandatory. 97 Narvaez later filed a
motion under § 2255, asserting that he was erroneously sentenced as a
career offender based on Chambers and Begay. 98 The district court
denied the motion, holding that Chambers and Begay did not apply
retroactively. 199
On appeal, the government conceded that Chambers and Begay
applied retroactively to the case and that Narvaez's prior convictions
were not "crimes of violence" within the meaning of the career
offender guideline.'* However, the government argued that
Narvaez's claim was not cognizable under § 2255.201 The Seventh
Circuit reversed the district court's denial of relief and ordered that
Narvaez be resentenced without application of the career offender
guideline.2 02 The court originally issued an opinion in June 2011,
which asserted that the error in the sentence amounted to a due
process violation. 03 After the government moved for en banc
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Narvaez v. United States, 674 F.3d 621, 623 (7th Cir. 2011).
197. Id. at 623.
198. Id.
199. United States v. Narvaez, No. 09-CV-222-BBC, 2009 WL 1351811, at *2 (W.D.
Wis. May 12, 2009).
200. Narvaez, 674 F.3d at 625.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 630.
203. United States v. Narvaez, 641 F.3d 877, 883 (7th Cir. 2011).
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consideration, the court issued an amended opinion in December
2011, which eliminated the due process holding but reached the same
result." The amended opinion noted that it had been circulated to
the active judges on the court, and none favored hearing the case en
banc.0 s
The Narvaez Court acknowledged that Sentencing Guideline
errors are generally not cognizable on collateral review. 06 However,
the court found that Narvaez's case "present[ed] a special and very
narrow exception: A post-conviction clarification in the law ...
rendered the sentencing court's decision unlawful."a20  The court
reasoned that "Mr. Narvaez never should have been classified as a
career offender." 208 Since "[t]he career offender status illegally
increased Mr. Narvaez's sentence approximately five years beyond
that authorized by the sentencing scheme," "Mr. Narvaez's claim
[went] to the fundamental legality of his sentence and assert[ed an
error that constitute[ed] a miscarriage of justice, entitling him to
relief."209
The Seventh Circuit in Narvaez rejected the government's
assertion that Narvaez's claim did not present a miscarriage of justice
because his sentence was within statutory limits-and he would be
exposed to the same possible sentence if resentenced. The court
reasoned: "The sentencing court's misapplication of the then-
mandatory § 4B1.1 career offender categorization in Mr. Narvaez's
case was the lodestar to its Guidelines calculation," and
"[s]peculation that the district court today might impose the same
sentence is not enough to overcome the fact that, at the time of his
initial sentencing, Mr. Narvaez was sentenced based upon the
equivalent of a nonexistent offense." 210 The court concluded: "The
Government is correct that Mr. Narvaez does not have an absolute
right to a lower sentence. Nevertheless, he does have an absolute
right not to stand before the court as a career offender when the law
does not impose that label on him." 2 1 1
In sum, the Seventh Circuit found a claim of misapplication of
the career offender Guideline cognizable in a § 2255 motion-at least
204. Narvaez, 674 F. 3d at 627 n.10.
205. Id. at 623 n.3.
206. Id. at 627.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 630.
210. Id. at 629.
211. Id.
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where an intervening clarification in the law has established the
illegality of the sentence. The Seventh Circuit's decision is plainly at
odds with the Eighth Circuit's decision in Sun Bear212 and with
decisions of some district courts in other circuits. 13
3. Procedural Default
Some courts have denied § 2255 motions raising Begay-type
claims on the ground that the prisoners failed to raise the claims on
direct appeal and thus procedurally defaulted the claim.214 District
courts generally may not consider a claim under § 2255 if the issue
could have been raised at trial or on direct appeal and was not
raised.215 Failure to raise a claim-or "procedural default"-may be
excused if the prisoner can establish both "cause" for not raising the
claim sooner and "prejudice" that resulted from the error. 216
Although the cause and prejudice standard was developed in the
context of federal review of a claim by a state prisoner,217 courts have
extended it to § 2255 cases.2 18
Prisoners who cannot establish cause and prejudice may
overcome procedural default if they demonstrate that failure to
consider the claim will result in a "fundamental miscarriage of
justice." 219 Courts have found this standard satisfied where prisoners
make a persuasive showing that they are actually innocent of the
offense of conviction. In capital cases, the Supreme Court has held
that procedural default is excused if a prisoner shows he is actually
ineligible for the death penalty-i.e., innocent of the aggravating
factors that rendered him eligible for death.22' The circuits are split on
whether an "actual innocence" exception applies in the context of
212. Although the Seventh Circuit distinguished Sun Bear, noting that Sun Bear's
sentence had fallen within the Guideline range applicable without the career offender
enhancement, the court stated that "to the extent a tension between this opinion and the
Eighth Circuit's reasoning in Sun Bear exists, we respectfully disagree with our colleagues
on the Eighth Circuit." Id. at 630 n.14.
213. See supra note 149.
214. See, e.g., United States v. Gibson, 424 F. App'x 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2011).
215. 3 WRIGHT & WELLING, supra note 80, § 631. Issues resolved on direct appeal
cannot be raised in a § 2255 motion, absent a showing of an intervening change in law, new
evidence, "actual innocence," or counsel's ineffectiveness in presenting the issue. Id. § 628;
2 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 22, § 41.7[e).
216. 2 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 22, § 26.3.
217. See generally Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (establishing the cause and
prejudice standard).
218. See United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167 (1982).
219. See 2 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 22, § 26.4.
220. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298,321 (1995).
221. Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333,345 (1992).
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noncapital sentencing where a prisoner shows he is ineligible for an
enhanced sentence,2 2  and the Supreme Court declined to resolve this
issue in 2004 in Dretke v. Haley. 3 Thus, at least some circuits apply a
stricter procedural default rule to noncapital sentencing claims than
to conviction-based claims because they do not permit an "actual
innocence" exception in the sentencing context. In addition, some
circuits have said that Begay-type claims do not satisfy the "actual
innocence" exception because they relate to "legal innocence" and
not "factual innocence." 2 4
Prisoners raising Begay-type claims have not had much success in
persuading courts to excuse procedural default based on either
"cause" and "prejudice" or "actual innocence." Cause may be
established if the prisoner shows that counsel was ineffective for
failing to raise a Begay-type claimm or that the claim was so novel
prior to the Supreme Court decision that the "legal basis for his claim
was not reasonably available to counsel."2 This procedural default
framework causes many prisoners to fall between the cracks. Where
current law is against a defendant, courts still expect claims to be
preserved, at least if there are cases raising similar claims in the
pipeline. For example, the Sixth and Eighth Circuits held that
defendants procedurally defaulted their Begay-type claims even
though circuit law precluded relief at the time of appeal.2  However,
courts are also unlikely to find that counsel was ineffective for failing
to raise an issue that was precluded by law at the time."
222. Compare Spence v. Superintendent, Great Meadow Corr. Facility, 219 F.3d 162,
171 (2d Cir. 2000) ("[Tlhere is no reason why the actual innocence exception should not
apply to noncapital sentencing procedures."), with Embrey v. Hershberger, 131 F.3d 739,
740 (8th Cir. 1997) (en banc) ("More fundamentally, we think that Sawyer, in terms,
applies only to the sentencing phase of death cases."), and Reid v. Oklahoma, 101 F.3d
628, 630 (10th Cir. 1996) ("Accordingly, because '[a] person cannot be actually innocent of
a noncapital sentence,' petitioner's challenge to his recidivist enhancement does not fall
within the potential scope of the miscarriage of justice exception." (quoting United States
v. Richards, 5 F.3d 1369, 1371 (10th Cir. 1993))).
223. 541 U.S. 386, 393-94 (2004).
224. See infra note 229-43 and accompanying text.
225. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986) (ineffective assistance of counsel can
establish cause for procedural default); see also Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500,
504-06 (2003) (claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may be raised in § 2255 motion).
226. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 622 (1998).
227. See United States v. Gibson, 424 F. App'x 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2011); Lindsey v.
United States, 615 F.3d 998, 1000-01 (8th Cir. 2010); see also United States v. Coley, 336 F.
App'x 933, 936 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding that because the defendant did not raise a non-
constitutional issue on direct appeal, it is not cognizable on collateral review under
§ 2255).
228. United States v. Stewart, No. 1:06-CR00046, 2011 WL 4595243, at *11 (W.D. Va.
Oct. 3, 2011) (finding no ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to raise Begay claim).
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Prisoners have also not had much luck under the "actual
innocence" exception to the procedural default doctrine. In McKay v.
United States,229 the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the prisoner had
procedurally defaulted his claim that he was erroneously sentenced as
a career offender because his prior conviction for carrying a
concealed weapon was not a "crime of violence.""o Although McKay
had not previously challenged his career offender designation, he
sought to excuse procedural default on the ground that he was
"actually innocent" of being a career offender. 3 1 The Eleventh
Circuit noted the circuit split on whether the "actual innocence"
exception extends to noncapital sentences at all and concluded that
McKay would not prevail even if it did.232 The court reasoned that the
"actual innocence" exception relates to "factual innocence" and not
"legal innocence," stating "McKay makes the purely legal argument
that he is actually innocent of his career offender sentence because
his prior conviction for carrying a concealed weapon should not have
been classified as a 'crime of violence' under the Guidelines." 233 The
court reasoned further: "McKay does not even suggest, because he
cannot, that he did not actually commit the crime of carrying a
concealed weapon. In other words, he makes no claim of factual
innocence of the predicate offense." 234 The court concluded: "We thus
decline to extend the actual innocence of sentence exception to claims
of legal innocence of a predicate offense justifying an enhanced
sentence." 2
Curiously, prior to McKay, the government conceded in the
Eleventh Circuit in King v. United States236 that the "actual
innocence" exception excused procedural default when a petitioner
argued that he was erroneously sentenced under the ACCA in light
of Begay.237 The Eleventh Circuit ordered resentencing in King,"3 and
a district court in Georgia similarly ordered resentencing based on the
government's concession in another case. 239
229. 657 F.3d 1190 (11th Cir. 2011).
230. Id. at 1192.
231. Id. at 1196.
232. Id. at 1197-98.
233. Id. at 1199.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. 419 F. App'x 927 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
237. Id. at 928.
238. Id.
239. Brown v. United States, No. CV 409-070, 2010 WL 3656016, at *1 (S.D. Ga. Sept.
15,2010).
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In reaching its conclusion in McKay, the Eleventh Circuit relied
on the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Pettiford v. United States.2 40 In
Pettiford, the petitioner claimed in a § 2255 motion that he had been
erroneously sentenced under the ACCA because he did not have
three qualifying convictions.2 4' The Fourth Circuit had previously
held that the "actual innocence" concept applied to noncapital
sentencing proceedings, at least where habitual offender
enhancements were at issue.2 42 The court nonetheless found that
Pettiford's claim that his prior conviction did not trigger the ACCA
was a claim of "legal innocence," not "factual innocence," and thus
procedural default could not be excused.243
In sum, in the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits, a prisoner seeking
relief for a Begay-type claim not previously raised will not be able to
take advantage of the "actual innocence" exception because these
courts have concluded that such a claim relates to "legal," not
"factual," innocence.2" In addition, the Eighth and Tenth Circuits
have explicitly held that the "actual innocence of sentence" exception
is limited to the capital sentencing context.2 45
4. Statute of Limitations
Courts have also dismissed § 2255 motions raising Begay-type
claims on statute-of-limitations grounds. Under the AEDPA, a strict
one-year limitation period applies to § 2255 motions. The statute
provides that the limitations period begins to run from the latest of
four possible dates.24 The first, and most common, is the "the date on
which the judgment of conviction becomes final."" The second is
"the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by
governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the
United States is removed, if the movant was prevented from making a
motion by such governmental action."248 Third, is "the date on which
240. McKay, 657 F.3d at 1199.
241. Pettiford v. United States, 612 F.3d 270, 274 (4th Cir. 2010).
242. United States v. Mikalajunas, 186 F.3d 490, 495 (4th Cir. 1999) ("[W]e conclude
that under the reasoning of Maybeck actual innocence applies in non-capital sentencing
only in the context of eligibility for application of a career offender or other habitual
offender guideline provision."); United States v. Maybeck, 23 F.3d 888, 892-93 (4th Cir.
1994) (holding the "actual innocence" exception applicable in case involving incorrect
career offender enhancement under the Guidelines).
243. Pettiford, 612 F.3d at 284.
244. McKay, 657 F.3d at 1199; Pettiford, 612 F.3d at 284.
245. See supra note 222.
246. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f) (2006).
247. Id. § 2255(f)(1).
248. Id. § 2255(f)(2).
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the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if
that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review." 24 9 Fourth, and
finally, is "the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims
presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due
diligence."5 0
Five circuits and a number of district courts, have held that a
claim of "actual innocence" can excuse or equitably toll the statute of
limitations because of the constitutional concerns that would result
from finding such claims time-barred." Other circuits have rejected
these arguments." 2 Moreover, as noted above, circuits are also split
on whether the "actual innocence" concept applies at all with respect
to noncapital sentencing enhancements.
Courts that have found Begay and its progeny retroactive have
generally held that petitioners have a year from the date of the
Supreme Court decisions to file a § 2255 motion,25 4 whereas courts
holding that Begay and its progeny are not retroactive have found
that the cases do not restart the statute of limitations." Some courts
have considered § 2255 motions raising claims under Begay,
Chambers, or Johnson that have been brought more than a year after
the decisions. In these cases, courts have generally rejected arguments
that the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled or excused
249. Id. § 2255(f)(3).
250. Id. § 2255(f)(4).
251. See, e.g., Rivas v. Fischer, No. 10-1300-pr., 2012 WL 2686117, at *32 (2d Cir. July
9, 2012); Perkins v. McQuiggin, 670 F.3d 665, 675 (6th Cir. 2012); Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d
929, 931 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc); San Martin v. McNeil, 633 F.3d 1257, 1267-68 (11th Cir.
2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 158 (2011); Lopez v. Trani, 628 F.3d 1228, 1230-31 (10th Cir.
2010); Garcia v. Portuondo, 334 F. Supp. 2d 446, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Holloway v. Jones,
166 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1190 (E.D. Mich. 2001). Other courts have noted at least the
potential for constitutional concerns in failing to recognize an "actual innocence"
exception to the statute of limitations. See In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 248 (3d Cir.
1997). In 2010, the Supreme Court held in Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2564 (2010),
that the limitations period of § 2254(d) may be equitably tolled under extraordinary
circumstances. The Court emphasized the equitable nature of the remedy and the need for
courts to have some degree of flexibility. Id. at 2560.
252. See, e.g., Escamilla v. Jungwirth, 426 F.3d 868,871-72 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that
there is no "actual innocence" exception to § 2244(d)); David v. Hall, 318 F.3d 343, 347
(1st Cit. 2003) (same); Cousin v. Lensing, 310 F.3d 843, 849 (5th Cit. 2002) (same).
253. See supra note 222.
254. See, e.g., United States v. Narvaez, 674 F.3d 621, 625-26 (7th Cir. 2011).
255. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, No. 6:04-70-DCR, 2010 WL 55930, at *5 (E.D.
Ky. Jan. 4, 2010), rev'd, No. 10-5105, 2012 WL 3089348, at *1 (6th Cir. July 31, 2012)
("Although we have not yet decided whether Begay applies retroactively, we hold so
today.").
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because the prisoner is serving a sentence that is illegal.256 One district
court found that the statute of limitations should be excused on the
ground that the petitioner was "actually innocent" of being a career
offender under Begay.57
5. Ban on Second and Successive Motions
Courts have also considered whether prisoners can obtain
resentencing under Begay and its progeny even if they have already
litigated a previous § 2255 motion.25 8 The AEDPA provides that
courts may grant relief on second or successive motions only if the
claim is based on: (1) "newly discovered evidence that, if proven and
viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to
establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable
factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense," or (2)
"a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on
collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously
unavailable." 259 The exceptions are quite narrow. For example, the
first exception relates only to the guilt determination and not to
sentencing determinations-capital or otherwise. 26 The second
exception includes cases announcing new "constitutional rules" and
not decisions interpreting statutes.2 61
Following the AEDPA, some courts have allowed prisoners who
have previously used up their "one shot" at a § 2255 motion to use
§ 2241 petitions as a vehicle to pursue relief. Section 2255(e), the
"savings clause," specifically provides that § 2241 may be used where
256. See, e.g., United States v. Harris, No. 04-40111-JAR, 2010 WL 3946328, at *3 (D.
Kan. Oct. 5, 2010). But see Jones, 2012 WL 3089348, at *4.
257. Scott v. United States, 740 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1331 (S.D. Fla. 2010). This decision is
no longer good law in light of recent Eleventh Circuit decisions. See McKay v. United
States, 657 F.3d 1190,1199 (11th Cir. 2011).
258. See, e.g., Jones v. Castillo, No. 10-5376, 2012 WL 2947933, at *1-2 (6th Cir. July
20, 2012) (per curiam) (denying relief to prisoner erroneously sentenced under the
ACCA); Maher v. Shartle, 458 F. App'x 108, 108-09 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (denying
relief to prisoner claiming he was improperly sentenced as "career offender" under the
Guidelines); United States v. Brown, 456 F. App'x 79, 81 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam); Stine
v. Davis, 442 F. App'x 405, 405-06 (10th Cir. 2011); Bradford v. Tamez, 660 F.3d 226, 230
(5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam); Gilbert v. United States, 640 F.3d 1293, 1323 (11th Cir. 2011)
(en banc), cert denied, 123 S. Ct. 1001 (2012); Darden v. Stephens, 426 F. App'x 173, 174
(4th Cir. 2011) (per curiam); Collins v. Ledezma, 400 F. App'x 375, 376 (10th Cir. 2010).
259. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) (2006).
260. See, e.g., In re Dean, 341 F.3d 1247, 1248 (11th Cir. 2003); In re Vial, 115 F.3d
1192, 1198 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc); Hope v. United States, 108 F.3d 119, 120 (7th Cir.
1997).
261. See, e.g., United States v. Reyes, 358 F.3d 1095, 1097 (9th Cir. 2004); United States
v. Prevatte, 300 F.3d 792,798 (7th Cir. 2002).
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§ 2255 is "inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of [the
prisoner's] detention."62 Courts agree that prisoners may not use
§ 2241 simply because they are barred by restrictions contained in
§ 2255-as that result would render the AEDPA's provisions
meaningless. However, courts have held that § 2241 may be utilized in
certain narrow circumstances, such as when failure to allow collateral
review would raise serious constitutional questions. 263
The scope of the savings clause was heavily litigated after the
Supreme Court held in 1995 in Bailey v. United States2" that mere
possession of a firearm in connection with a drug-related offense was
not "use" of a firearm within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1).2 11
A conviction under § 924(c)(1) requires imposition of a five-year
consecutive sentence on top of a defendant's sentence for a federal
drug offense," and most courts had previously defined "use" much
more broadly.2 67 Bailey thus established that many prisoners were
serving longer sentences based on conduct that was not, in fact,
criminal under the statute. Some of the prisoners had already litigated
§ 2255 motions and could not file a successive motion because their
claim was not based on either "newly discovered evidence" or "a new
rule of constitutional law"-but rather on an interpretation of a
federal statute..26 Thus, a number of prisoners sought relief based on
Bailey under § 2241, alleging that § 2255 was inadequate and
ineffective to test their detention.269 Courts generally permitted these
claims to proceed, although the circuits adopted somewhat different
standards for permitting use of the savings clause. The tests from all
the circuits shared a focus on two factors: the prisoner had to
establish that (1) under a change in the law, he was actually innocent
of the offense and (2) he had no previous opportunity to pursue his
claim.270
262. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (2006).
263. 3 WRIGHT & WELLING, supra note 80, § 623 n.18.
264. 516 U.S. 137 (1995).
265. Id. at 143,
266. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2006).
267. Bailey, 516 U.S. at 140-46.
268. See, e.g., Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361, 369-70 (2d Cir. 1997).
269. See Lyn S. Entzeroth, Struggling for Federal Judicial Review of Successive Claims
of Innocence: A Study of How Federal Courts Wrestled with the AEDPA to Provide
Individuals Convicted of Non-Existent Crimes with Habeas Corpus Review, 60 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 75, 97-102 (2005).
270. See, e.g., Abdullah v. Hedrick, 392 F.3d 957, 960-63 (8th Cir. 2004); Reyes-
Requena v. United States, 243 F.3d 893, 903-04 (5th Cir. 2001); in re Jones, 226 F.3d 328,
333-34 (4th Cir. 2000); Charles v. Chandler, 180 F.3d 753, 757 (6th Cir. 1999); Wofford v.
Scott, 177 F.3d 1236, 1244-45 (11th Cir. 1999); In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 610-11 (7th
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A number of prisoners have tried to use § 2241 to obtain relief
on Begay-type claims and have analogized their situation to prisoners
raising Bailey claims.271 As with Bailey prisoners, they are serving
additional time in prison based on a misinterpretation of the scope of
a federal statute. The Eleventh Circuit initially held in Gilbert v.
United States27 2 that prisoners may bring second or successive
petitions raising claims under Begay," but then changed course in an
en banc decision.2 74
In Gilbert, the defendant pleaded guilty to possession with intent
to distribute drugs and was classified as a career offender under the
Guidelines. As a result of this classification, his sentencing range was
increased from 151 to 188 months to 292 to 365 months. 7 At his
sentencing in 1997, Gilbert argued that his predicate conviction for
carrying a concealed weapon was not a "crime of violence" under the
Guidelines.2 76 The district court rejected the argument and imposed a
sentence of 292 months under the then-mandatory Sentencing
Guidelines.27 7 The court noted its belief that the sentence was "too
high," but said that it did not see a basis under law to depart
downward.278 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, and Gilbert was later
unsuccessful on his pro se § 2255 motion.279
After Begay was decided, the Eleventh Circuit held that carrying
a concealed firearm was not a "crime of violence" under the
Guidelines. 280 Gilbert sought relief under § 2241. Gilbert cited the
Eleventh Circuit's decision in Wofford v. Scott,281 which had held that
the savings clause applies to an otherwise barred claim when:
1) [t]hat claim is based upon a retroactively applicable Supreme
Court decision; 2) the holding of that Supreme Court decision
establishes the petitioner was convicted for a nonexistent
offense; and, 3) circuit law squarely foreclosed such a claim at
Cir. 1998); Triestman, 124 F.3d at 363; In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 251-52 (3d Cir.
1997).
271. See, e.g., Jones v. Castillo, No. 10-5376, 2012 WL 294733, at *1 (6th Cir. July 20,
2012); Gilbert v. United States, 640 F.3d 1293, 1300-02 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert.
denied, 123 S. Ct. 1001 (2012).
272. 609 F.3d 1159 (11th Cir. 2010), rev'd en banc, 640 F.3d 1293.
273. Id. at 1160-62.
274. Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1295.
275. Gilbert, 609 F.3d at 1160.
276. Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1300.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 1300-01.
279. Id.; United States v. Gilbert, 138 F.3d 1371, 1372 (11th Cir. 1998) (per curium).
280. See United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1347 (11th Cir. 2008).
281. 177 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 1999).
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the time it otherwise should have been raised in the petitioner's
trial, appeal, or first § 2255 motion.2 12
The district court held that erroneous sentencing as a career
offender did not constitute conviction for a "nonexistent offense,"
and thus relief was not available to Gilbert.2 3 A three-judge panel of
the Eleventh Circuit reversed. 2 ' The panel began by noting that, as of
the time of the decision, Gilbert had served 171 months and, but for
the erroneous enhancement, would be entitled to release. 285 The
panel found Wofford's test applicable.286 The court reasoned:
"Gilbert's Begay/Archer claim does not assert mere factual error in
the application of the Sentencing Guidelines. His claim is like a Bailey
claim in that it asserts error of fundamental dimension-enhancement
of his sentence based upon a nonexistent offense."" The court
concluded that the "animating principle underlying the writ of habeas
corpus is fundamental fairness" and "the principle of finality 'must
yield to the imperative of correcting a fundamentally unjust
incarceration.' "288
The Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc-and over forceful
dissents-vacated the panel decision and affirmed the district court's
dismissal of the petition.2 89 The en banc opinion stated its assumptions
that Gilbert would have received a lower sentence had Begay been
the law at the time of his sentencing and that he would receive a
lower sentence today if he was resentenced.290 Nonetheless, the court
denied relief. 9' The court dismissed Gilbert's "actual innocence"
argument, stating: "The Wofford dicta and the Bailey-related "actual
innocence" decisions of other circuits are of no use to Gilbert because
the crimes for which he was convicted, possessing crack cocaine with
intent to distribute and possessing marijuana with intent to distribute,
do exist, as thousands of federal prisoners can attest."292 In
considering Gilbert's claim, the court reasoned that the "critically
282. Id. at 1244.
283. Gilbert v. United States, 609 F.3d 1159, 1162 (11th Cir. 2010), rev'd en banc, 640
F.3d 1293.
284. Id. at 1160.
285. Id. at 1163.
286. Id. at 1165-67.
287. Id. at 1165.
288. Id. at 1167-68 (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 135 (1982)).
289. Gilbert v. United States, 640 F.3d 1293, 1293 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert.
denied, 123 S. Ct. 1001 (2012).
290. Id. at 1302-03.
291. Id. at 1324.
292. Id. at 1319-20.
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important nature of the finality interests safeguarded by § 2255(h)
weighs heavily against an interpretation of the savings clause that
would lower the second or successive motions bar and permit
Guidelines-based attacks years after the denial of an initial § 2255
motion."9 The court reasoned that accepting Gilbert's rule would
open the floodgates because it could not be "confined to sentence
miscalculations based on enhancement errors." 294 As a result, "no
federal judgment imposing a sentence would be truly final until the
sentence was completely served or the prisoner had gone on to face a
different kind of final judgment." 295 Thus, "[t]he exception that
Gilbert would have us write into § 2255(h) using the savings clause as
our pen would wreak havoc on the finality interests that Congress
worked so hard to protect with the AEDPA provisions."2'
Judge Martin, joined by Judges Barkett and Hill, dissented
vigorously. Judge Martin noted that Gilbert had "diligently pursued
every legal avenue available to him, including, of course, direct
appeal to this Court," and yet he still "face[d] a sentence of more than
24 years despite [the court's] admission that [it] decided his case
wrongly."2 97 The dissent reasoned that "[o]ur duty to interpret [the
savings clause] according to its plain terms is especially robust in light
of the Suspension Clause of the United States Constitution." The
dissent further noted, "By today's decision we have shirked our duty
in that regard, and in doing so we diminish the institution of the
federal courts."29 8 Regarding the finality interests cited by the
majority, the dissent stated:
Surely Mr. Gilbert's case is a poor vehicle to promote the idea
that finality builds confidence in our criminal justice system.
Today we tell a man he must sit in the penitentiary for years
beyond the sentence that a proper application of the law would
have imposed when we rejected his correct interpretation of
what the law meant back in 1998.299
The dissent emphasized that arguments favoring finality in some
cases such as spoliation of evidence were simply not in play in this
scenario, given that the issue presented was a "purely legal one.""o
293. Id. at 1309.
294. Id. at 1310.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 1330 (Martin, J., dissenting).
298. Id. at 1333.
299. Id. at 1334.
300. Id.
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Responding to the majority's concerns about opening the
"floodgates," the dissent remarked:
[I]f there are others who are wrongfully detained without a
remedy, we should devote the time and incur the expense to
hear their cases. What is the role of the courts, if not this? But
what is important today is the consequence to Mr. Gilbert of
our unwillingness to correct our past legal error.o1
Judge Hill dissented separately and was joined by Judge Barkett.
Regarding the result reached by the majority, Judge Hill said: "I
recognize that without finality there can be no justice. But it is equally
true that, without justice, finality is nothing more than a bureaucratic
achievement. Case closed. Move on to the next." 3  Judge Hill
emphasized that "[flor this court to hold that it is without the power
to provide relief to a citizen that the Sovereign seeks to confine
illegally for eight and one-half years is to adopt a posture of judicial
impotency that is shocking in a country that has enshrined the Great
Writ in its Constitution." 3 He concluded:
Much is made of the "floodgates" that will open should the
court exercise its authority to remedy the mistake made by us in
Gilbert's sentence. The government hints that there are many
others in Gilbert's position-sitting in prison serving sentences
that were illegally imposed. We used to call such systems
"gulags." Now, apparently, we call them the United States."
Thus far, the Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits have
agreed with the Eleventh Circuit in Gilbert and have rejected the use
of the savings clause to permit prisoners erroneously sentenced as
career offenders under the Guidelines to pursue relief in § 2241
petitions. Prisoners have analogized their situation to prisoners
raising Bailey claims and argued that they are "actually innocent" of
being career offenders, as Bailey prisoners were actually innocent of
their firearm offenses. However, the circuits have refused to extend to
the Sentencing Guidelines context the savings clause exception that
allowed Bailey claims to proceed. 05 Notably, at least one district
court has permitted relief on a Guideline claim under § 2241,
301. Id. at 1336.
302. Id. at 1337 (Hill, J., dissenting).
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 456 F. App'x 79, 81-82 (3d Cir. 2012); Bradford
v. Tamez, 660 F.3d 226, 230 (5th Cir. 2011); Darden v. Stephens, 426 F. App'x 173, 174
(4th Cir. 2011) (per curiam); Collins v. Ledezma, 400 F. App'x 375, 376 (10th Cir. 2010).
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apparently without opposition from the government.
However, a circuit split has developed regarding prisoners
wrongfully sentenced as Armed Career Criminals. Following Gilbert,
the Eleventh Circuit allowed a prisoner who had already used up his
§ 2255 shot to pursue a § 2241 petition alleging that Begay and
Chambers established that he had been erroneously sentenced under
the ACCA.0 In Chaplin, the government conceded that the prisoner
should have been permitted to pursue his claim because § 2241 relief
is available "where the defendant had no prior opportunity to obtain
judicial correction of a fundamental defect in his sentence."' The
government noted:
The government undeniably has a strong interest in the finality
of its criminal convictions and in preventing frivolous and
repetitive prisoner postconviction litigation, and thereby
conserving the limited resources of government attorneys and
courts alike. At the same time, however, the government does
not have a valid institutional interest in keeping in prison an
individual who is innocent of the crime for which he was
convicted. The government likewise has no valid institutional
interest in keeping an individual in prison beyond the statutory
maximum sentence prescribed by Congress; in fact, the
government has a strong interest in preventing this type of
injustice.309
In addition, in a district court case within the Fourth Circuit, the
government also conceded the availability of § 2241 to challenge
erroneous ACCA sentences.o
306. In Phillips v. Holinka, No. 10-cv-439-bbc, 2012 WL 1516605 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 26,
2012), the district court granted the prisoner's unopposed motion for relief under § 2241
on the ground that the prisoner had been erroneously sentenced as a career offender. Id.
at *1-2. The court stated that
[tJo satisfy the savings clause, petitioner had to show that (1) that [sic] he was
barred under § 2255(h) from raising his claim in a second or successive § 2255
motion; (2) his petition was based on a rule of law not yet established at the time
he filed his first § 2255 motion and that the law has retroactive effect on collateral
review; and (3) there was a fundamental defect in his sentence that would lead to a
complete miscarriage of justice if not corrected.
Id. at *1. Relying on Narvaez v. United States, 674 F.3d 621 (7th Cir. 2011), the court found
the "miscarriage of justice" test applicable, and ordered resentencing without the
application of the career offender guideline. Phillips, 2012 WL 1516605, at *2.
307. Chaplin v. Hickey, 458 F. App'x 827, 827 (11th Cir. 2012).
308. Brief of Appellee at 6, Chaplin v. Hickey, 458 F. App'x 827 (11th Cir. 2010) (No.
10-12022-D).
309. Id. at 10-11 (citing Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)).
310. See Gallimore v. Stansberry, No. 1:10cv138, 2011 WL 797320, at *1-2 (E.D. Va.
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In contrast, in Jones v. Castillo,"' the government argued that
§ 2241 was not available to prisoners alleging erroneous ACCA
sentences based on Begay.312 The Sixth Circuit agreed and denied
relief.313
6. Waivers of Collateral Attack Rights in Plea Agreements
Finally, many courts have rejected § 2255 motions alleging
erroneous Guideline sentences under Begay, Chambers, or Johnson
on the ground that defendants waived in their plea agreements the
right to seek collateral review at all.314
In recent years, the government has increasingly sought and
obtained plea agreements in which defendants specifically waive the
right to appeal and to seek § 2255 relief.315 A 2005 study randomly
sampled 971 federal cases and found that two-thirds of defendants
Mar. 1, 2011). In this case, the government noted:
[T]he United States as a result of a decision by the Solicitor General of the United
States, has modified its position regarding those instances in which one may
invoke habeas jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to challenge putative
sentencing errors. More specifically, the United States presently maintains that the
so-called "savings clause" of § 2255(e) applies to vest district courts with
jurisdiction to entertain habeas petitions that challenge sentences that now-after
intervening Supreme Court authority unavailable either at the time of sentencing
or when § 2255 provided a viable remedial mechanism-are in excess of the
otherwise statutory maximum punishment for the particular crime.
Supplemental Memorandum of Law Regarding Respondent's Motion to Dismiss at 1-2,
Gallimore v. Stansberry, No. 1:10cv138, 2011 WL 797320 (E.D. Va. Mar. 1, 2011). The
government recently described its position on the issue as follows:
It is the position of the United States that the savings clause permits a § 2241
petition for a sentencing error where the error resulted in a sentence above the
statutory maximum for the crime of conviction; but savings clause relief is
foreclosed for an erroneous sentence within the statutory maximum, even if the
sentence was imposed pursuant to a mandatory guidelines regime.
Wilson v. Wilson, No. 1:11cv645, 2012 WL 1245671, at *3 (E.D. Va. Apr. 12, 2012)
(emphasis and citation omitted).
311. No. 10-5376, 2012 WL 2947933 (6th Cir. July 20, 2012).
312. Id. at *1-2. The government made these arguments after its concessions in the
Eleventh Circuit and in the district court within the Fourth Circuit. Presumably, the
government took a different position in Jones because of differing circuit precedent.
313. Id.
314. See, e.g., Ramirez v. United States, No. 8:10-cv-988-T-27EAJ, 2011 WL 3489600,
at *1 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 9, 2011); United States v. Watkins, No. 1:08-cr-270, 2011 WL
3100377, at *4 (W.D. Mich. July 25, 2011); Bender v. United States, No. 11-CV-2004, 2011
WL 2110760, at *1 (C.D. Ill. May 26, 2011).
315. See Nancy J. King & Michael E. O'Neill, Appeal Waivers and the Future of
Sentencing Policy, 55 DUKE L.J. 209, 230-31 & n.83 (2005).
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waived appeal rights in the plea agreement.' 6 Three-quarters of the
group that waived appeal rights also waived collateral attack rights."'
Although courts usually enforce waivers of collateral attack
rights in plea agreements, the waivers must have been knowing and
voluntary. 19 Prisoners who have waived collateral attack rights may
nonetheless seek relief on a claim that the sentence exceeded the
statutory maximum, 320 was based on an impermissible factor such as
race, or resulted in a "miscarriage of justice." 322 Courts have
recognized that "actual innocence" may render waiver provisions
unenforceable.3 23 A plea agreement waiver does not bar a claim that
counsel was ineffective in negotiating the plea agreement or waiver
provision, but courts have found waivers enforceable as to claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing.324
Although plea agreement waivers should not be enforced if
denial of relief results in a miscarriage of justice, courts have
apparently concluded that Begay-type Guideline errors do not
amount to a sufficient injustice to preclude enforcement of waivers.
Courts have even enforced plea agreement waivers when prisoners
claim that the sentence was imposed in excess of the statutory
maximum-i.e., in an ACCA case."
In sum, courts have made it very difficult for prisoners with
"final" sentences to obtain relief based on Begay-type claims. For the
most part, courts have narrowly construed existing exceptions to
procedural barriers and barred relief for prisoners.
316. Id. at 212.
317. Id. at 213. "Of the sample, 113 agreements barred appeal only (18.3 percent of 619
waivers), and 494 barred appeal and collateral review (79.8 percent of all 619 waivers)."
Id. at 243 n.105.
318. See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 396 F.3d 1340, 1342 (11th Cir. 2005) (collecting
cases).
319. United States v. Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179, 1181-83 (10th Cir. 2001).
320. DeRoo v. United States, 223 F.3d 919, 923 (8th Cir. 2000).
321. Cockerham, 237 F.3d at 1182.
322. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 410 F.3d 137, 151 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting
United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886,891 (8th Cir. 2003)); United States v. Porter, 405 F.3d
1136, 1142 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1325 (10th Cir.
2004)).
323. See, e.g., United States v. Ray, 358 F. App'x 329, 331 (3d Cir. 2009); United States
v. Torres-Oliveras, 583 F.3d 37, 43 (1st Cir. 2009).
324. King & O'Neill, supra note 315, at 247 & n.122 (collecting cases).
325. See, e.g., Bender v. United States, No. 11-CV-2004, 2011 WL 2110760, at *2 (C.D.
Ill. May 26,2011).
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III. OVERCOMING BARRIERS TO RESENTENCING
As discussed above, prisoners asserting claims in collateral
proceedings that their sentences were wrongfully enhanced under
Begay and its progeny have faced major hurdles to relief. In many
cases, judges have refused on procedural grounds to correct clear
injustices. What is striking about many of these cases is that the
sentencing error itself is entirely undisputed: everyone agrees that the
prisoner was sentenced incorrectly. In addition, because of the
intervening Supreme Court cases, the error did not become apparent
until after the period of direct review was complete. Thus, the
prisoner did not have a previous opportunity to get the error fixed.
Yet even under these circumstances, courts have often denied relief.
The obstacles to relief for prisoners raising Begay-type claims are
based on both judge-made doctrines and statutory provisions. The
discussion below explores how even within the constraints of current
Supreme Court doctrine and Congressional statutes, there is room for
lower courts to correct many Begay-type errors. In particular, the
various procedural barriers to collateral relief can be overcome if
courts: (1) find all sentencing errors impacting the length of the
sentence cognizable under § 2255; (2) excuse procedural default
based on a prisoner's "actual innocence" of a sentencing
enhancement; (3) toll the statute of limitations based on a showing of
"actual innocence"; (4) allow prisoners who litigated a § 2255 motion
to seek relief under § 2241 because an intervening clarification of the
law established the inapplicability of the enhancement; and (5) refuse
to enforce collateral attack waivers in plea agreements where the
prisoner is ineligible for the enhancement. Even if courts adopt
narrower exceptions to the procedural barriers, many Begay-type
errors could be corrected. Courts can permit correction of these
errors without opening the door to relitigation of every sentence. In
fact, many errors could be corrected without the need for full
resentencing hearings.
A. Relief for Sentencing Enhancement Claims Under the AEDPA
and Supreme Court Precedent
Lower courts could, within existing law, correct sentencing errors
on collateral review much more frequently. Courts may excuse many
of the barriers to relief where there has been a "miscarriage of
justice," and they have considerable flexibility under Supreme Court
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law in determining what constitutes such a miscarriage.326 Other
barriers may be excused based on a showing of "actual innocence"-
and the Supreme Court has explicitly left open the question of
whether the "actual innocence" concept applies with respect to
noncapital sentencing enhancements.32 7 Thus, lower courts could use
this flexibility to grant relief more frequently in cases seeking
sentencing relief.
It bears noting that the Supreme Court has already allowed
correction of sentences in analogous circumstances. The Court has
explicitly held that a prisoner is permitted to return to federal court
for resentencing under § 2255 when his federal sentence was based on
a prior conviction that was subsequently vacated after the federal
sentence was imposed. 28 The prisoner simply needs to show that he
acted with reasonable diligence in trying to vacate the conviction after
it was used to enhance the federal sentence. 9 If a prisoner can get his
sentence fixed when a prior conviction is vacated, why shouldn't the
court correct the sentence when a clarification in the law establishes
that the prior conviction should have never triggered the
enhancement in the first place? In both cases, the person does not, in
fact, have qualifying convictions. If anything, the latter circumstance
is more sympathetic because the person never had a prior qualifying
conviction. It is difficult to discern a policy basis for granting relief
when a conviction is vacated but denying relief when the conviction
should not have been used at all for the enhancement.
1. Exceptions to Judge-Made Barriers
Judge-made barriers to relief on § 2255 claims include doctrines
of retroactivity, cognizability, and procedural default. All of these
barriers may be overcome in some circumstances.
Retroactivity doctrines should not be a bar to relief when a
prisoner seeks to rely on a case, such as Begay, that has narrowed the
326. See infra notes 334-45 and accompanying text,
327. Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386,389 (2003).
328. Johnson v. United States, 544 U.S. 295, 298 (2005).
329. Id. at 310. In Johnson, the Court held that a defendant must act diligently after his
sentence is enhanced based on a prior conviction to obtain a state court order vacating his
predicate conviction. Id. If he does so, then the one-year statute of limitations begins to
run from the date he receives notice of that vacatur. Id Johnson relied on the AEDPA
provision that begins to run the statute of limitations on "the date on which the facts
supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise
of due diligence." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(4) (2006). The Court reasoned that the state order
vacating the conviction was a "fact" within the meaning of this provision. Johnson, 544
U.S. at 306-07.
126 [Vol. 91
CORRECTION OF SENTENCING ERRORS
scope of a sentencing enhancement provision. The Supreme Court
has established that substantive decisions that "narrow the scope of a
criminal statute by interpreting its terms" apply retroactively because
they carry the risk that a defendant "faces a punishment that the law
cannot impose upon him."' The circuits that have squarely
addressed this issue have held that Begay and its progeny are
retroactive, and the government has even conceded the issue in some
cases. 331 Thus, retroactivity should be a non-issue in these cases.
Cognizability is a more complicated issue, but should not be a
bar to most Begay-type enhancement claims. Courts will certainly
find cognizable in a § 2255 motion a claim that a recidivist
enhancement such as the ACCA was erroneously imposed and
resulted in a sentence above the otherwise applicable statutory
maximum. However, as noted above, the circuits are split on whether
a claim of an erroneous career offender enhancement under the
Guidelines is cognizable."' Courts presumably would be even less
likely to find cognizable a claim of an erroneous Guideline
enhancement that raises the sentence less dramatically than the
career offender provision.3
Lower courts have considerable leeway under the statutory
language of § 2255 and Supreme Court law in determining
cognizability. Section 2255, by its terms, applies to sentences imposed
in "violation of ... the laws of the United States."33 4 The Supreme
Court has held that non-constitutional claims are cognizable if the
error results in a "miscarriage of justice."3 s The Court has addressed
in five cases the issue of whether a non-constitutional claim amounts
to a miscarriage of justice and thus is cognizable under § 2255. Four
cases dealt with procedural errors, and the Court found that no
miscarriage of justice had occurred.3 In the fifth case, Davis v.
330. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351-52 (2003) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
331. See supra notes 157, 163.
332. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
333. For example, Guideline enhancements based on "crimes of violence" apply in
immigration and gun possession cases. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§§ 2K2.1, 2L1.2 (2011) (covering firearm and immigration Guidelines, respectively). These
enhancements are substantial, but less severe than the career offender enhancement.
334. 18 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (Supp. IV 2011).
335. See infra notes 336-39 and accompanying text.
336. See Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 342, 350 (1994) (holding that a lack of
compliance with time limit for commencing trial did not amount to a miscarriage of
justice); United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 186-87 (1979) (holding no miscarriage
of justice where there was a subsequent change in the policies of the United States Parole
Commission that impacted parole eligibility date); United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S.
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United States, 37 the Supreme Court addressed a substantive error-
the petitioner had been convicted under a statute for conduct that a
subsequent interpretation of the statute established was not
criminal.3 8 There, the Court found that a miscarriage of justice had
occurred and § 2255 relief was available.339
Although lower courts have considerable flexibility under
Supreme Court law in defining what claims are cognizable under
§ 2255, courts have generally developed the doctrine of cognizability
to limit the sentencing claims that can be considered with § 2255
motions. Many courts have simply stated that "ordinary" claims of
erroneous sentences under the Guidelines are not cognizable even
when it is clear that the error has impacted sentence length.o Yet
nothing in the text of § 2255 or Supreme Court case law requires this
result. Even after Booker, courts must calculate the Guidelines
accurately and consider the correctly calculated range.34' Sentences
imposed without correct Guideline calculations are in violation of
law, and, on direct review, these cases are remanded to the district
court from the appellate court. Why shouldn't a claim that a court
erroneously applied a Guideline enhancement be cognizable in a
§ 2255 motion, at least where the court concludes that the mistake
impacted the ultimate sentence? Isn't this a miscarriage of justice?
Some courts have asserted that no miscarriage of justice occurs
with respect to Guideline errors because the sentence is within
statutory limits.342 Yet it is undeniable that Guideline calculations still
drive federal sentences in federal court,13 and it will often be clear
from the record that the court would have imposed a different
sentence but for the Guideline miscalculation. Moreover, since the
sentencing judge is the one ruling on the § 2255 motion, the court can
simply deny relief if the erroneous calculation did not actually impact
the ultimate sentence. Erroneous Guideline calculations are not
780, 781, 784-85 (1979) (holding error under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11
regarding the taking of a guilty plea not cognizable); Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424,
428-29 (1962) (finding denial of allocution at sentencing, which violated Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 32(a), not cognizable).
337. 417 U.S. 333 (1974).
338. Id. at 346-47.
339. Id.
340. See, e.g., United States v. McGee, 201 F.3d 1022, 1023 (8th Cir. 2000); United
States v. Pregent, 190 F.3d 279, 284 (4th Cir. 1999); United States v. Williamson, 183 F.3d
458, 462 (5th Cir. 1999).
341. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245-46 (2005).
342. Sun Bear IV, 644 F.3d 700,705 (8th Cir. 2011).
343. See supra note 71.
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"procedural" mistakes but are much more akin to the substantive
error the Supreme Court found cognizable in Davis.3"
Courts categorize some Guideline errors as non-cognizable
because they view them as too small or trivial to be worthy of fixing
on collateral review. However, when Guideline errors result in
sentences that are longer than would otherwise have been imposed,
courts should reject the view that the errors are too small or trivial to
correct. Guideline errors, such as those under the career offender
provision, can result in enormous sentencing jumps. From the
perspective of someone sitting in prison, any additional time on a
sentence can hardly be considered a trivial error.
Thus, consistent with statutory and Supreme Court law, courts
could conclude that all Guideline errors impacting the length of the
sentence are cognizable under § 2255. However, even if courts did not
want to go this far, they could still draw the cognizability line in a way
that permits correction of many Begay-type errors. For example,
courts could conclude that a guideline-based claim is cognizable
where an intervening clarification of the law establishes that the
sentencing court's decision was unlawful. The theory there is that to
deny consideration of a claim that was not available at the time of the
original sentencing or on direct review would be "a miscarriage of
justice." Alternatively, courts could conclude that a lot of extra time
(such as an erroneous career offender determination) is a
"miscarriage of justice," but a smaller jump resulting from a less
severe enhancement is not.34
Finally, procedural default rules are also judge-made and,
consistent with Supreme Court doctrine, courts could apply these
doctrines more flexibly in reviewing Begay-type errors. The Supreme
Court has held that "actual innocence" excuses procedural default 46
and has left open the question of whether "actual innocence" applies
in the noncapital sentencing context.3 47 Thus, lower courts have the
ability to excuse procedural default based on a prisoner's "actual
innocence" of a sentencing enhancement. Those courts that have
344. See Narvaez v. United States, 674 F.3d 621, 627-28 (7th Cir. 2011).
345. In Narvaez, the Seventh Circuit found a claim cognizable where the prisoner was
sentenced as a career offender under a mandatory Guideline regime and an intervening
clarification of law revealed he was not a career offender. Id. at 627-28. It is unclear which
of these factors--the length of the sentencing increase, the mandatory nature of the
Guidelines at the time of sentencing, or the intervening clarification-drove the decision,
and if the Seventh Circuit would require the existence of all of these factors to grant relief.
346. Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 347 (1992); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 497
(1986).
347. Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 389 (2004).
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refused to extend the "actual innocence" concept to the sentencing
enhancement context are not prohibited by Supreme Court law from
changing course.
Some courts have left open the possibility of the "actual
innocence" concept applying in the noncapital sentencing
enhancement context, but have concluded that a Begay-type claim
raises only a claim of "legal innocence" and not "factual
innocence."3 48 Courts have suggested that for a career offender to
establish his "factual innocence," he would have to establish his
innocence of the underlying state convictions." This approach makes
little sense. To be a career offender (or an Armed Career Criminal), a
defendant must be convicted of a qualifying federal offense and have
a certain number of prior predicate convictions."o If he does not have
the type of convictions that qualify for the enhancement, then it is
perfectly logical to say that he is actually-and factually-innocent of
being a career offender. It does not matter whether he actually
committed the conduct underlying the predicate conviction, as it is
not the prior conduct that triggers the enhancement, but the nature of
the prior conviction. The nature of the prior conviction is established
by court records from the prior case. In contrast, to determine if
someone is factually innocent of the conduct underlying the prior
case, the court would need to examine the factual circumstances of
the prisoner's past conduct. Presumably, the prisoner would submit
affidavits from himself or others asserting his innocence, and the
government would need to produce evidence to the contrary. In most
cases, a hearing would be required. It seems odd that courts
concerned with finality principles would prefer re-litigation of the
facts underlying a prior state conviction over the very simple analysis
of whether the prisoner in fact has the type of prior conviction that
triggers the federal enhancement.
In an analogous context, prisoners are currently obtaining relief
for their "actual innocence." In United States v. Simmons,"s1 the
Fourth Circuit held that a defendant's prior North Carolina
348. McKay v. United States, 657 F.3d 1190, 1198 (11th Cir. 2011); United States v.
Pettiford, 612 F.3d 270, 282 (4th Cir. 2010); see also Tellado v. United States, 799 F. Supp.
2d 156, 172 (D. Conn. 2011) (holding that petitioner failed to assert valid "actual
innocence" claim because "he raise[dj only a legal argument" that two of his convictions
should not count for the purpose of "a career offender designation").
349. McKay, 657 F.3d at 1198-99.
350. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2006); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 411.1
(2011).
351. 649 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 2011).
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marijuana possession offense did not meet the definition of a "felony"
under federal law.352 North Carolina has a complicated scheme for
determining the maximum sentence for many offenses, and Simmons
overruled prior circuit precedent on the issue. As a result of
Simmons, it is now apparent that many prisoners are serving
sentences for felon-in-possession-of-firearm offenses when they are
not, in fact, felons.3 54 After first opposing relief for these individuals,
the government has now shifted positions and supports the release of
these prisoners based on their "actual innocence." 55 It is unclear why
Simmons-claims would be considered claims of "factual innocence,"
whereas Begay-type claims are merely ones of "legal innocence." In
both scenarios, an intervening court decision has clarified that a prior
state conviction does not satisfy a federal definition. Of course,
prisoners under Simmons are actually innocent of the offense of
conviction, whereas Begay-prisoners are innocent of a sentencing
enhancement. Yet this distinction should have no bearing on the
"factual/legal innocence" issue. Begay-type claims should qualify
under the "actual innocence" exception.5  In sum, the judicial
doctrines that limit habeas relief-retroactivity, cognizability, and
procedural default-need not be a bar to relief for Begay-type claims.
2. Excusing Statutory Barriers
Unlike the judicial doctrines discussed above, the statute of
limitations and ban on successive § 2255 motions have been dictated
by Congress. However, there are both statutory exceptions and judge-
made exceptions to these statutory barriers.5 Prisoners raising most
352. Id. at 249-50.
353. Id. at 240-41.
354. See id.
355. Brad Heath, Dozens of "Innocent" Prisoners Could Be Freed, USA TODAY, Aug.
13, 2012, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-08-13/innocent-federal-
prisoners-justice/57041342/1.
356. Notably, shortly after the United States Department of Justice's decision not to
oppose relief in felon-in-possession cases, the Fourth Circuit denied collateral relief to a
prisoner who argued that his sentence for a drug offense was erroneously enhanced based
on the miscategorization of his prior conviction as a felony drug conviction. United States
v. Powell, No. 11-6152, 2012 WL 3553630, at *5 (4th Cir. Aug. 20, 2012). The enhancement
increased the defendant's sentence from ten years to twenty years' imprisonment. The
court reasoned that the Supreme Court's decision in Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S.
Ct. 2577 (2010), upon which Simmons relied, was not retroactive. Powell, 2012 WL
3553630, at *3-5. Although this case addressed Simmons in the sentencing context, the
retroactivity holding would apply also in felon-in-possession cases as well. See id. at *6
(King, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
357. The statutory exceptions to the statute of limitations are set forth in 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255(f)(2)-(4) (2006). Judge-based exceptions to the statute of limitations include the
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Begay-type claims could fit within these recognized exceptions,
consistent with current Supreme Court law.
First, regarding the statute of limitations, the AEDPA already
states an exception to the one-year limitations period for claims based
on a right that has been "newly recognized by the Supreme Court and
made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review."35 8 Thus,
if Begay-type claims are brought within one year of the relevant
Supreme Court decision, the statute of limitations will not bar relief.
However, some individuals do not fit within this statutory
exception--either because they filed their Begay-type claim more
than a year after the relevant Supreme Court decision, or because
they based their claim on a circuit court decision rather than a
Supreme Court decision.5 9 Courts could nonetheless toll the statute
of limitations in some of these cases based on a prisoner's "actual
innocence" of the enhancement provision.3 6 An equitable tolling
approach would work well to address these cases. Rather than excuse
the statute of limitations in every case involving a claim of an
improper enhancement, courts could toll the statute of limitations
only when an intervening clarification of law establishes the
prisoner's "actual innocence" and the prisoner pursues relief with
reasonable diligence. The Supreme Court used a similar standard
when determining when a prisoner can obtain resentencing after
vacating a state conviction.36' Using the equitable tolling doctrine,
doctrine of equitable tolling and, in some circuits, the "actual innocence" exception. See,
e.g., Rivas Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2554 (2010) ("We here decide that the
timeliness provision in the federal habeas corpus statute is subject to equitable tolling.");
v. Fischer, No. 10 1300 pr., 2012 WL 2686117, at *2 (2d Cir. July 9, 2012). The statutory
exceptions for the ban on successive § 2255 petitions appear at § 2255(h). 28 U.S.C. 28
U.S.C. § 2255(h) (2006). Section 2255(e), the "savings clause," allows § 2241 to be used
when § 2255 is "inadequate or ineffective" to test the legality of the detention. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255(e) (2006).
358. § 2255(f)(3).
359. See, e.g., Tellado v. United States, 799 F. Supp. 2d 156, 160 (D. Conn. 2011)
(holding that claim was time barred when prisoner relied on the Second Circuit decision
decided after his sentencing that established that prior conviction was not a "controlled
substance offense" and should not have triggered the career offender guideline).
360. As noted above, a number of courts have now recognized that a claim of "actual
innocence" can excuse or toll the statute of limitations, and the Supreme Court has left
open the question of whether "actual innocence" exceptions apply in the noncapital
sentencing context. See Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2549; Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393-94
(2004); Rivas, 2012 WL 2686117, at *2; Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 931 (9th Cir. 2011);
Lopez v. Trani, 628 F.3d 1228, 1230-31 (10th Cir. 2010); Souter v. Jones, 395 F.3d 577, 585
(6th Cir. 2005); Garcia v. Portuondo, 334 F. Supp, 2d 446, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Holloway
v. Jones, 166 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1190 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
361. See supra notes 328-29 and accompanying text.
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courts could permit prisoners to seek relief under circuit court
decisions establishing their innocence of the enhancement as long as
they act diligently in seeking relief after the decision. 3 62 Courts could
generally refuse to toll the limitations period for prisoners raising
claims based on new Supreme Court cases-as the AEDPA already
allows these decisions to restart the statute of limitations. However, in
rare instances, there may be equitable reasons for tolling. 63
Second, although § 2255 generally prohibits the filing of second
or successive motions, the "savings" clause allows a prisoner to seek
relief under § 2241 where § 2255 proves to be an "inadequate or
ineffective remedy" to test the legality of a prisoner's detention.364
Any prisoner barred from filing a second or successive § 2255 motion
cannot simply file a § 2241 petition. 65 As discussed above, courts have
held that a prisoner raising a claim of "actual innocence" may
nonetheless proceed under § 2241 if the claim is based on an
intervening decision and the prisoner has not had a previous
opportunity to raise the claim."* Courts could hold that a prisoner
raising a Begay-type claim fits within this existing exception because
the Supreme Court decision established "actual innocence" of a
recidivist enhancement provision, and the prisoner did not have a
previous opportunity to raise the claim. Alternatively, if courts
wanted to avoid the "actual innocence" characterization, they could
simply hold that § 2241 is available when the defendant had no prior
opportunity to obtain judicial correction of a fundamental defect in
the sentence. As noted above, the government has adopted this
position in some circuits.3 67 In the government's view, however, a
fundamental sentencing defect occurs only when the sentence exceeds
362. In Tellado, the court rejected "actual innocence" as a basis for equitable tolling in
these circumstances. 799 F. Supp. 2d at 160. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied
heavily on finality interests. See id. ("This is a difficult case because it places the societal
interest in finality of judgments against the possibility of a shorter sentence for the
Petitioner, Shawn Tellado. In the end and for the reasons discussed below, the Court
believes that the societal interest in finality overcomes Mr. Tellado's personal interest in a
shorter sentence.").
363. The Sixth Circuit recently granted relief to a prisoner who filed his § 2255 petition
raising a Begay claim three months after the one-year statute of limitations (that had been
restarted with the Begay decision) expired. The court applied the equitable tolling
doctrine based on the prisoner's diligence in pursuing relief, his difficulty in obtaining legal
materials because of frequent transfers, and his partial illiteracy. See Jones v. United
States, No. 10-5105,2012 WL 3089348, at *4 (6th Cir. July 31,2012).
364. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (2006).
365. Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361, 363 (2d Cir. 1997).
366. See supra note 270 and accompanying text,
367. See supra notes 308-10 and accompanying text.
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the statutory maximum. Courts should adopt a somewhat broader
view and hold that a fundamental sentencing defect has occurred
when a defendant is erroneously subject to a Guideline enhancement,
such as the career offender enhancement, which results in a major
sentence increase.
3. Avoiding Plea Agreement Waivers
Waivers of collateral attacks in plea agreements need not
prevent courts from considering Begay-type claims. Courts have held
that waivers will not preclude consideration of claims that a prisoner
was sentenced in excess of the statutory maximum or where failure to
consider a claim would result in a "miscarriage of justice."" Courts
have recognized that "actual innocence" may render waiver
provisions unenforceable. 69
It could be argued that collateral attack waivers should never be
enforced because they cannot be truly knowingly and voluntarily
made. Appeal waivers and collateral waivers are substantially
different in nature. Appeal waivers relate to a proceeding that occurs
relatively close in time to the plea."7 o A defendant generally will have
a good sense at the time of plea what rights he or she is giving up
because those rights will relate to issues that have already been
decided (i.e., suppression or severance motions) or matters regarding
the Sentencing Guidelines (i.e., whether certain disputed
enhancements will apply). Waiving one's right to ever bring a
collateral attack is a much broader waiver in many respects because a
collateral attack can occur much later in time. One cannot be sure
about how the law may change, what new evidence might emerge, or
how technological developments might impact an assessment of the
case.
Despite these differences, courts have generally treated appeal
waivers and collateral attack waivers as analogous."' However, at the
very least, collateral attack waivers should not preclude relief when
(1) the claim is based on an intervening change of law that could not
have been anticipated at the time of the plea, and (2) the prisoner is
serving a sentence based on an enhancement that was plainly
368. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 410 F.3d 137, 151 (4th Cir. 2005); United States
v. Porter, 405 F.3d 1136, 1145 (10th Cir. 2005).
369. See, e.g., United States v. Ray, 358 F. App'x 329, 330 (3d Cir. 2009); United States
v. Torres-Oliveras, 583 F.3d 37, 43 (1st Cir. 2009).
370. Notices of appeal must be filed within fourteen days of the entry of judgment.
FED. R. APp. P. 4(b)(1)(A).
371. See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 396 F.3d 1340, 1342 (11th Cir. 2005).
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erroneous. Under these circumstances, failure to consider the claim
would result in a miscarriage of justice. The government should
decline to seek enforcement of collateral attack waivers in these
circumstances, and courts should refuse to enforce them.
B. Addressing Concerns About Floodgates
As described above, courts could correct many Begay-type
errors, even in light of Supreme Court constraints and the AEDPA's
limitations. The various procedural barriers to collateral relief can be
overcome if courts (1) find all sentencing errors impacting the length
of the sentence cognizable under § 2255; (2) excuse procedural
default based on a prisoner's "actual innocence" of a sentencing
enhancement; (3) toll the statute of limitations based on a showing of
"actual innocence"; (4) allow prisoners who litigated a § 2255 motion
to seek relief under § 2241 because an intervening clarification of the
law established the inapplicability of the enhancement; and (5) refuse
to enforce collateral attack waivers in plea agreements where the
prisoner is ineligible for the enhancement.
Courts may be concerned that excusing procedural barriers on
these grounds will open the floodgates to resentencing in every case.
However, the number of resentencings will be contained. Moreover,
courts could place further restrictions on resentencings while still
correcting many Begay-type errors.
The "actual innocence" exception, which would excuse some
procedural barriers, is a narrow one. In many cases, prisoners would
be unable to make a persuasive showing of "actual innocence" of a
sentencing enhancement. In the context of capital sentencing errors,
the Supreme Court has held that "to show 'actual innocence' one
must show by clear and convincing evidence that, but for a
constitutional error, no reasonable juror would have found the
petitioner eligible for the death penalty."372 The Second Circuit has
extended the "actual innocence" exception to noncapital sentencing
enhancements, and explained the inquiry is "whether, by clear and
convincing evidence, defendant has shown that he is actually innocent
372. Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 336 (1992). This is a higher standard than the
standard applicable to "actual innocence" of the crime itself, which requires only a
showing that "it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found
petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1994); see
also Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 559-60 (1998) (holding that a capital petitioner
must show by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable juror would have found
him eligible for the death penalty).
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of the act on which his harsher sentence was based.""'
Thus, in the context of a claim of an erroneous enhancement, for
a court to find the "actual innocence" exception applicable, the court
would have to find that the prisoner presented "clear and convincing
evidence" that the enhancement was inapplicable. With Begay-type
claims, the court will be able to easily determine based on objective
records of the prior conviction whether the enhancement was applied
in error. In contrast, prisoners will generally not be able to meet the
"clear and convincing" standard if the enhancement related to a
factual issue, such as whether they played a leadership role in the
offense or possessed a gun. In most instances, courts would likely find
that the evidence submitted by the defendant disputing these
enhancements does not demonstrate by clear and convincing
evidence their innocence of the conduct. Therefore, the high standard
for establishing "actual innocence" of an enhancement would prevent
many resentencings.
Moreover, courts could consider Begay-type claims on the merits
without holding that inapplicability of an enhancement alone will
suffice to excuse all of the procedural barriers. As suggested above,
courts could toll the statute of limitations in cases only if the prisoner
shows that an intervening change of law establishes the inapplicability
of the enhancement and when the prisoner has exercised reasonable
diligence in pursuing the claim. Similarly, courts could permit
prisoners to avoid the ban on successive motions by filing § 2241
petitions only when an intervening change of law establishes "actual
innocence" (or inapplicability) of the enhancement and where the
prisoner has not had a previous opportunity to raise the claim. Courts
could also require both "actual innocence" and an intervening change
of law to excuse procedural default and plea agreement waivers.
Finally, courts could hold that guideline-based claims are only
cognizable if there has been an intervening change of law. This more
restrictive approach, requiring "actual innocence" plus an intervening
change of law to excuse procedural barriers, would reduce the
number of viable claims. For example, if a prisoner merely claimed a
Guideline enhancement was based on an erroneous factual finding by
the sentencing court, collateral relief could not be granted. Notably,
373. Spence v. Superintendent, Great Meadow Corr. Facility, 219 F.3d 162, 172 (2d Cir.
2000). According to the Second Circuit, "[w~here a petitioner shows by clear and
convincing proof that he is actually innocent of the conduct on which his sentence is based,
the incarceration is fundamentally unjust and the miscarriage of justice exception to the
procedural default bar applies." Id.
374. See id.
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even with this more restrictive approach, many Begay-type errors
would be fixed.
In addition to requiring an intervening change of law, courts
could restrict relief further by holding that the concept of "actual
innocence" applies with respect to noncapital sentencing
enhancements only if the enhancement is a recidivist enhancement-
i.e., an enhancement triggered by a prior conviction. The justification
for including only recidivist enhancements is that they generally lead
to big sentencing jumps, and it is very easy to determine at the
collateral review stage-based simply on documentary evidence-
whether one was correctly imposed. Again, Begay-type claims would
be fixed under this approach.
A final approach is to restrict relief to only those instances where
the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum-i.e., ACCA cases.
Courts could hold that Guidelines claims are noncognizable or could
restrict the "actual innocence" concept to cases where the sentence
exceeds the statutory maximum. However, errors in calculating the
Guidelines can impact a defendant's sentence just as much as errors
in applying statutes. Defendants should be sentenced according to the
correct interpretation of the law. These guideline-based sentencing
errors should be corrected, at least where the defendant had no
previous opportunity to obtain correction of the error or the error led
to a major sentence increase.
C. Crafting a Limited Scope of Relief
Another issue to consider is the precise nature of relief available
under § 2255 for sentencing errors. In Narvaez, when the Seventh
Circuit reversed the district court's denial of relief under § 2255, the
court stated that on remand: "the district court [was] to impose the
sentence applicable without the imposition of a career offender
status" and "[n]o other aspect of the sentence [was] to be
revisited.""' In contrast, in some cases where district courts have
granted § 2255 motions based on Begay-type claims, they have
ordered full resentencings, including the preparation of new
presentence reports.7
The statutory text of § 2255 provides that if grounds exist for
granting the motion, the court "shall vacate and set the judgment
aside and shall discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a
375. Narvaez v. United States, 674 F.3d 621, 630 (7th Cir. 2011).
376. Brown v. United States, Nos. CV-409-070, CR-404-11, 2010 WL 3656016, at *1
(S.D. Ga., Sept. 15, 2010).
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new trial or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate."" Thus,
with respect to sentencing errors, courts have the power to
"resentence" or to "correct the sentence as may appear
appropriate."3  Courts have held that this language "confers a 'broad
and flexible' power to the district courts 'to fashion an appropriate
remedy.' "
If the error was Guideline-based and did not affect the applicable
statutory range for the sentence, then it seems that the court could
determine that the appropriate remedy in some cases is to simply
impose a new sentence within the corrected-Guideline range-much
as courts reduced a large number of sentences without full
resentencings in crack cases pursuant to the retroactive Sentencing
Guideline amendments.380 Such a sentence reduction may not even
require the presence of the prisoner in court.3 1 Given the flexibility
granted to courts by the § 2255 remedy, it appears that courts would
have the power to fashion this sort of limited relief. Indeed, decisions
377. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b) (2006).
378. Id. § 2255(b).
379. United States v. Hillary, 106 F.3d 1170, 1171 (4th Cir. 1997); see also United States
v. Torres-Otero, 232 F.3d 24, 30 (1st Cir. 2000) ("As an initial matter, we note the broad
leeway traditionally afforded district courts in the exercise of their § 2255 authority.").
380. In 2007, and again in 2010, the Sentencing Commission reduced the recommended
sentencing ranges in crack cases. In both instances, the Commission gave retroactive effect
to the amended Guidelines, which permits courts to modify "final" sentences under 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2006). Under the 2007 amendments, federal district courts processed
25,515 motions, granting 16,433 and denying 9,082. See Press Release, U.S. Sentencing
Comm'n, U.S. Sentencing Votes Unanimously to Apply Fair Sentencing Act of 2010
Amendment to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Retroactively (June 30, 2011),
http://www.usse.gov/Legislative-andPublicAffairs/Newsroom/PressReleases/20110630.
PressRelease.pdf. The Supreme Court in Dillon v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2683 (2010),
recently clarified that when a sentence is modified pursuant to a retroactive Guideline
amendment, the prisoner is not entitled to a full resentencing. Id. at 2691. Instead, the
court may impose a new sentence within the amended Guideline range, but generally may
not go lower than the bottom of that range. Id. In addition, the presence of the defendant
is not required before the court adjusts the sentence. Id. at 2692.
381. Last year, in Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229 (2011), the Supreme Court
affirmed the wide discretion of courts in resentencing when cases are remanded after
appeal. Id. at 1241. The Court concluded that § 3742(g)(2), which prohibited a district
court at resentencing after remand from imposing a sentence outside the Guidelines range
except upon a ground it relied upon at the prior sentencing, was invalid after Booker. Id.
at 1243. Because this provision required the district court to treat the Guidelines as
mandatory, it could not withstand Booker. Id. at 1241. Thus, after Pepper, district courts
conduct full resentencings after cases are remanded, and can consider any factor that they
could have considered at the first sentencing, as well as post-sentencing rehabilitation. Id.
at 1249-50. Pepper interpreted the statute governing sentences after remands from appeal,
and did not speak to a district court's power to fashion relief under § 2255(a). Id. Since
nothing about § 2255(a) requires the court to treat the Guidelines as mandatory, granting
limited relief-and not a full resentencing-is not inconsistent with Booker or Pepper.
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by sentencing courts to grant § 2255 motions and impose a new
sentence without a hearing have been affirmed. 82 Thus, although
courts plainly have the power to grant a full resentencing under
§ 2255,383 in some instances they could simply reduce the sentence
without a hearing.3? In other instances, they may conclude that they
should start afresh and hold a new hearing. A district court judge,
who is already familiar with the case and the reasoning behind the
original sentence, has the ability to make this call.
IV. RETHINKING FINALITY AND SENTENCING
The above discussion has demonstrated that although there are
numerous barriers to relief for federal prisoners seeking resentencing
on collateral review, exceptions to these barriers exist. Consistent
with statutory provisions and existing Supreme Court law, lower
courts could fix many more sentencing errors. But although they
could correct the mistakes, courts are choosing not to do so in many
cases. Citing interests in finality, they often refuse on procedural
grounds to correct the sentences of prisoners who are serving plainly
unjust sentences. The aftermath of Begay has revealed the great
emphasis that courts place on notions of finality when reviewing
claims of sentencing errors.
Despite the increasing amount of litigation in this area, courts
and scholars have not carefully analyzed the specific finality interests
at stake in reviewing a challenge to a sentence as opposed to a
conviction. A close examination of the arguments favoring finality
reveals that there is considerably less justification for treating
sentences as final as compared to convictions. Courts have been
overstating the interests in finality of sentences, and they should be
fixing more sentencing mistakes.
A. Articulating Finality Interests
Arguments favoring finality of criminal judgments have
developed over the years in scholarship and court decisions. After an
382. United States v. Hadden, 475 F.3d 652, 669 (4th Cir. 2007) ("The text of § 2255
clearly affords the district courts the authority to 'correct' a prisoner's unlawful sentence
without conducting a formal 'resentenc[ing]' hearing .... ").
383. See United States v. Green, No. 3:06-00143, 2010 WL 1905012, at *4 (S.D. W. Va.
May 11, 2010).
384. In addition, if the request for sentence correction comes through a § 2241 petition,
the court also possesses broad power to "dispose of the matter as law and justice require."
28 U.S.C. § 2243 (2006). It seems there too that courts could correct errors in some cases
without conducting a full resentencing.
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expansion in the reach of habeas review under the Warren Court, the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts greatly narrowed the availability of
collateral relief.8 5 Central to the rationale for limiting habeas review
is the asserted interest in finality of criminal judgments.
Roughly speaking, the arguments in favor of finality that have
emerged from scholarship and court decisions can be divided into six
main categories: Promoting finality (1) respects notions of comity and
federalism; (2) preserves resources and avoids delay in other court
cases; (3) furthers the criminal law's goal of deterrence and
rehabilitation of offenders; (4) avoids problems that result from
staleness of evidence; (5) protects victims from the harm that may
come from the repeated revisiting of the case by the courts; and (6)
provides psychological benefits by allowing society to move on and
feel confident in the judicial system. As explored below, many of
these arguments favoring finality are considerably weaker in the
context of correcting a sentencing error as opposed to a conviction
error.
In his 1963 article, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas
Corpus for State Prisoners,16 Paul Bator articulated arguments in
favor of finality of criminal judgments. Over the years, the Supreme
Court has relied heavily on Bator's views regarding the importance of
finality,"" and his work has shaped scholarly attention to the topic. 88
As a starting point, Bator reasoned that we can never really be
sure that a judgment is actually free from legal or factual error, and at
a certain point, we must conclude that detention is "legal," not in
some "actual" or absolute sense, but because institutional processes
have been empowered to definitively establish legality.3 89 Thus, "if a
criminal judgment is ever to be final, the notion of legality must at
some point include the assignment of final competencies to determine
legality." "3 Bator identified a number of arguments favoring more
restrictive habeas review.
First, Bator argued that "conservation of resources"-not just
economic, but also the intellectual, moral, and political resources of
385. 1 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 22, § 2.4[d].
386. Bator, supra note 12, at 452.
387. See, e.g., Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 272 (2008); Calderon v. Thompson,
523 U.S. 538, 555 (1998); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309 (1989).
388. Bator's article is cited in 471 law review articles available on WestlawNext alone.
WESTLAWNEXT, https://1.next.westlaw.com (search "76 HARV. L. REV. 441"; then click
"Citing References"; then click "Secondary Sources"; then click "Law Reviews").
389. Bator, supra note 12, at 447.
390. Id. at 450-51.
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the legal system-was at stake. Efforts should not be duplicated just
for sake of it. Rather, there must be some reasoned justification for
another "go-around.""' In addition, Bator argued that multiple go-
arounds could actually be harmful because he could "imagine nothing
more subversive of a judge's sense of responsibility, of the inner
subjective conscientiousness which is so essential a part of the difficult
and subtle art of judging well, than an indiscriminate acceptance of
the notion that all the shots will always be called by someone else." 39
Second, Bator asserted that the effectiveness of the "substantive
commands" of the criminal law is jeopardized by a lack of finality.
The idea that someone who violates the law will swiftly and certainly
be subject to just punishment is "essential to the educational and
deterrent functions of the criminal law."393 In addition, Bator
suggested that lack of finality actually undermines the rehabilitation
of offenders because re-education may not even begin "if we make
sure that the cardinal moral predicate is missing, if society itself
continuously tells the convict that he may not be justly subject to
reeducation and treatment in the first place." 394
Finally, Bator argued that "[r]epose is a psychological necessity
in a secure and active society, and it should be one of the aims"-
though not the sole aim-of "a procedural system to devise doctrines
which, in the end, do give us repose, do embody the judgment that we
have tried hard enough and thus may take it that justice has been
done."" According to Bator, "There comes a point where a
procedural system which leaves matters perpetually open no longer
reflects humane concern but merely anxiety and a desire for
immobility." Bator asserted that "we must accept the fact that human
institutions are short of infallible; there is reason for a policy which
leaves well enough alone and which channels our limited resources of
concern toward more productive ends." 96 He stressed that he did
"not counsel a smug acceptance of injustice merely because it is
disturbing to worry whether injustice has been done," but rather he
sought a "general procedural system which does not cater to a
perpetual and unreasoned anxiety that there is a possibility that error
has been made in every criminal case in the legal system.""
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. Id. at 452.
394. Id.
395. Id.
396. Id. at 453.
397. Id.
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The next year, Anthony Amsterdam published Search, Seizure,
and Section 2255: A Comment, an influential piece focusing on the
finality interests specifically at stake with respect to federal review of
federal convictions. 9 8 In addition to concerns about duplication of
efforts and delay, Amsterdam emphasized the problem of stale
evidence. He observed that postponed litigation of fact "will often be
less reliable in reproducing facts (i) respecting the postconviction
claim itself and (ii) respecting the issue of guilt if the collateral attack
succeeds in a form which allows retrial." 3 9 Amsterdam noted that the
combination of these considerations will present a more or less
persuasive argument against the cognizability of a claim, depending
on "the nature of the claim, the manner of its treatment (if any) in the
conviction proceedings, and the circumstances under which collateral
litigation must be had."40 0 For example, Amsterdam reasoned that a
claim that a prisoner pleaded guilty to a statute unconstitutional on its
face "offends none of these interests significantly," whereas "a claim
that he was irresponsible by reason of insanity at the time of the
crime for which he was sentenced ten years ago given a full trial
without his raising the issue, significantly offends them all."401
Several years later, in his article Is Innocence Irrelevant?
Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments,402 Judge Friendly argued
that habeas relief for federal prisoners should be limited to (1)
challenges to the criminal process itself, including lack of counsel; (2)
cases "where the defendant poses constitutional claims he could not
practically have advanced before the conviction or where proper
procedures were not provided for doing this;" (3) constitutional
claims "resulting from changes in the rules of the game to whatever
extent the Supreme Court indicates;" and (4) all other constitutional
claims subject only to "a colorable showing of innocence."0 Judge
Friendly cited a number of problems with delaying finality. Relying
on Bator, he expressed concern with collateral attacks interfering
with the rehabilitation of offenders and emphasized "the human
desire that things must sometime come to an end."'# Like
398. Amsterdam, supra note 13, at 390.
399. Id. at 384.
400. Id.
401. Id. at 384 (footnotes omitted). In weighing arguments in favor and against finality,
Amsterdam concluded that Fourth Amendment claims should not be cognizable in § 2255
motions. Id. at 388.
402. Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal
Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142, 150 (1970).
403. Id. at 170.
404. Id. at 149.
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Amsterdam, he argued that the longer the delay, the less reliable the
fact-finding on the issue giving rise to the attack, and the reduced
likelihood of a successful retrial.40 Judge Friendly was also concerned
about resources: he asserted that the time of judges and lawyers was
better spent bringing the accused to trial promptly, rather than
devoted to collateral attacks.4 06 Finally, he cited Justice Jackson's
observation that "[uit must prejudice the occasional meritorious
application to be buried in a flood of worthless ones."407
Notably, the articles by Bator, Friendly, and Amsterdam focus
on issues impacting convictions and do not discuss the specific finality
interests at issue when prisoners challenge only sentences. It bears
noting that in the era of this scholarship, the length of a federal
sentence was considerably less "final" than it is now, as Rule 35
continued until 1987 to allow sentencing courts to correct illegal
sentences "at any time," and, until 1984, the federal Parole
Commission had a great deal of control over release dates as the law
required offenders to serve no more than one-third of their
sentences. 408 In fact, the Parole Guidelines were specifically designed
to smooth out disparities between sentencing judges-i.e., "finality"
was postponed in many ways.
Over the years, the Supreme Court has relied heavily on the
finality arguments developed by these scholars in developing
doctrines to restrict habeas relief. For example, Judge Friendly's
article was cited in Supreme Court cases limiting successive
petitions, 40 9 expanding the procedural default doctrine, 4 o and holding
habeas relief unavailable for Fourth Amendment claims already
litigated in state court.41 1 The Court has articulated similar arguments
favoring finality-including the need to preserve resources, avoid
problems from stale evidence, promote deterrence and rehabilitation,
and the human desire to simply put matters to rest.412
Justice Harlan, a strong proponent of finality of criminal
405. Id. at 147.
406. Id. at 148-49.
407. Id. at 149 (quoting Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 537 (1953) (Jackson, J.,
concurring)).
408. See discussion supra Part I.B.
409. Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436,454 (1986).
410. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1986) (quoting Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1,
10 (1984)); Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 539 (1986); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 126
n.31 (1982).
411. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 491 n.31 (1976). Professor Lasch has carefully
charted the Court's reliance on Judge Friendly's work. See Lasch, supra note 151, at 24.
412. See, e.g., Engle, 456 U.S. at 126-29.
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judgments, argued that "[b]oth the individual criminal defendant and
society have an interest in insuring that there will at some point be
the certainty that comes with an end to litigation," and "that attention
will ultimately be focused not on whether a conviction was free from
error but rather on whether the prisoner can be restored to a useful
place in the community."4 13 In his concurrence in Mackey v. United
States,414 he set forth a framework for determining the retroactivity of
new constitutional rules that would later be adopted by the Court in
Teague v. Lane.415 In Mackey, Justice Harlan argued that "[s]urely it
is an unpleasant task to strip a man of his freedom and subject him to
institutional restraints" but "this does not mean that in so doing, we
should always be halting or tentative."416 Citing Friendly, Justice
Harlan emphasized the drain on resources, 417 and relying on
Amsterdam, he expressed concern about stale evidence.418
Chief Justice Burger also promoted the finality of criminal
judgments, and echoed the arguments of others before him.419 He
asserted that "collateral review undermines the interest in repose that
underlies the principle of res judicata, degrades the importance of the
trial, frustrates penological goals and drains the resources of the
judicial system."420 He reasoned, "Our willingness to entertain these
late claims tells prisoners that they need never reconcile themselves
to what has happened: they need never 'make peace' with society,
learn a new way of life, or attempt to build a realistic future."421 In
addition, "[i]nmates exploit society's misplaced sentiment" and have
an "incentive to 'store up' technical challenges" to conviction.422
Moreover, the Court has frequently emphasized the special
413. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
414. 401 U.S. 667, 675 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
415. 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989).
416. Mackey, 401 U.S. at 691.
417. Id. ("While men languish in jail, not uncommonly for over a year, awaiting a first
trial on their guilt or innocence, it is not easy to justify expending substantial quantities of
the time and energies of judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers litigating the validity
under present law of criminal convictions that were perfectly free from error when made
final.").
418. Id. ("This drain on society's resources is compounded by the fact that issuance of
the habeas writ compels a State that wishes to continue enforcing its laws against the
successful petitioner to relitigate facts buried in the remote past through presentation of
witnesses whose memories of the relevant events often have dimmed. This very act of
trying stale facts may well, ironically, produce a second trial no more reliable as a matter
of getting at the truth than the first.").
419. Spalding v. Aiken, 460 U.S. 1093,1095-96 (1983).
420. Id.
421. Id.
422. Id.
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finality concerns present when a federal court reviews a state
judgment. Central to the holding in Teague v. Lane were concerns
about federalism and comity.423 In McCleskey v. Zant, which placed
limits on successive petitions, the Court emphasized:
Finality has special importance in the context of a federal attack
on a state conviction. Reexamination of state convictions on
federal habeas frustrate[s] ... both the States' sovereign power
to punish offenders and their good-faith attempts to honor
constitutional rights. Our federal system recognizes the
independent power of a State to articulate societal norms
through criminal law; but the power of the State to pass laws
means little if the State cannot enforce them.42 4
Over time, an additional concern about the harm to victims from
a lack of finality began to emerge in Court opinions. For example, in
Calderon v. Thompson, Justice Kennedy noted in reversing the Ninth
Circuit's decision vacating a death sentence that "[o]nly with real
finality can the victims of crime move forward knowing the moral
judgment will be carried out."425
The value the Court places on finality continues to have a major
influence on its decisions today.426 Strikingly, outside the context of
capital cases, the Court has rarely noted the different finality interests
at stake with respect to sentencing claims as compared to conviction-
based claims.427
B. Finality and Correction of Sentences
Below, the Article discusses finality interests in the context of
collateral review of sentencing errors. Before turning to this topic, a
note about capital cases is in order. Capital sentences raise a whole
host of finality concerns that differ from those of noncapital
sentences. Death itself is "final" in a way that other sentences are
not,4" and occurs at a moment of time rather than over a continuous
423. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 308 (1989).
424. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 480 (1991) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 555-56 (1998) (discussing
the importance of the finality of state judgments).
425. Calderon, 523 U.S. at 556.
426. See, e.g., Greene v. Fisher, 132 S. Ct. 38,44 (2011).
427. One exception is with respect to double jeopardy claims, where the Court has
observed that defendants have less of an expectation in the finality of sentencing decisions
as compared to acquittals. See Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 114-15 (2003);
United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 139 (1980).
428. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 87 (1985) (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("In capital
cases the finality of the sentence imposed warrants protections that may or may not be
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period of time, as with a sentence of incarceration.429 Vacating a death
sentence raises resource issues not at play in noncapital cases-as
capital sentencing proceedings are much more time consuming and
must be held before a jury. The special finality concerns present in
capital cases have received scholarly attention elsewhere 43 0 and are
beyond the scope of this Article. The discussion below examines
finality arguments in the context of noncapital sentences.
1. Comity and Federalism
Courts and scholars often cite concerns about comity and
federalism when emphasizing the importance of finality of criminal
judgments. Indeed, as discussed above, the Supreme Court has
recognized that finality is most important in the context of federal
court review of state court convictions.43 1 Concerns about comity and
federalism are entirely absent when a federal court reviews its own
judgment in a § 2255 proceeding, and thus these principles do not
weigh in favor of treating federal convictions as final.
2. Resources
Those advocating for limitations on federal post-conviction
review point to a concern about preservation of judicial and other
resources. 33  As described below, these concerns are more
pronounced in the context of federal review of state judgments as
compared to federal review of federal judgments. In addition, when a
habeas petition seeks merely a correction of a sentence, rather than a
retrial, there should be less of a concern about draining resources as a
court can correct a sentence more efficiently than holding a new trial,
and shortening a sentence means saving money that would otherwise
have been spent on incarceration.
Regarding resources, several distinctions should be drawn
required in other cases.").
429. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 363 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
430. See, e.g., Robert Batey, Federal Habeas Corpus and the Death Penalty: "Finality
with a Capital F," 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 252, 253-54 (1984); Robert S. Catz, Federal Habeas
Corpus and the Death Penalty: Need for a Preclusion Doctrine Exception, 18 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1177, 1178 (1985); James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 COLUM.
L. REV. 2030,2078 (2000).
431. See supra notes 423-24 and accompanying text.
432. See generally NANCY J. KING & JOSEPH L. HOFFMAN, HABEAS FOR TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY: USES, ABUSES, AND THE FUTURE OF THE GREAT WRIT 108-21
(arguing that § 2254 should be restricted but § 2255 slightly expanded, in light of different
federalism concerns).
433. See supra text accompanying notes 391-92,406.
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between § 2254 and § 2255 proceedings. A § 2255 petition differs
from a § 2254 petition in that it represents a federal prisoner's first
chance at collateral review. With a § 2254 petition, the prisoner has
already had an opportunity for collateral review in the state, and the
federal § 2254 petition is the second chance at collateral review.3
Thus, the federal resources spent on a § 2254 petition are on top of
the resources provided at the post-conviction stage in the state.435 A
§ 2255 petition, by contrast, is just the first shot at collateral attack.43
Some types of claims, by their nature, could not have been raised at
all previously, such as a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
There is another important difference with respect to resources
between review of § 2254 and § 2255 petitions. When a federal judge
reviews a § 2254 petition from a state prisoner, review of the case will
take considerable time because the judge lacks any familiarity with
the case. Thus, the original state proceeding must be examined, along
with the subsequent appeal and any state collateral review
proceedings and appeals. In contrast, a § 2255 motion goes back to
the original trial judge who took the plea or oversaw the trial and
imposed the original sentence.437 Thus, § 2255 motions are
adjudicated more efficiently.
Most sentencing-based claims are easy to evaluate. Judges will
usually need to review only a short sentencing transcript rather than
an entire trial transcript. Motions raising Begay-type claims are
particularly easy to resolve. At issue in resolving the collateral attack
is whether the defendant actually had the type of prior conviction that
qualifies for the recidivist enhancement. To evaluate the § 2255
motion, the federal judge simply looks at court records from the
earlier proceeding that adjudicated the prior case and does not
engage in new fact-finding about the defendant's prior conduct.4 8 No
434. Lasch, supra note 151, at 66.
435. Id. at 67 (arguing that § 2255 proceedings "are a second round of litigation-not a
third round, as in federal habeas review of state-court judgments" and thus "the finality
interests attaching in such proceedings are not as great as a state's interest in finality at the
time of federal habeas review").
436. Taylor v. Gilkey, 314 F.3d 832, 836 (7th Cir. 2002); see also Lasch, supra note 151,
at 65-66 (describing the functional differences between federal postconviction proceedings
and federal habeas review).
437. 2 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 22, § 41.4[c).
438. The Supreme Court has held that in determining whether a prior conviction
triggers a federal recidivist enhancement, the sentencing court must use a "categorical
approach" and ordinarily may " 'look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory
definition of the prior offense.'" Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 17 (2005) (quoting
Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990)). In some instances, the prior conviction
is under a statute that is either a perfect match for the federal enhancement, or covers a
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hearing is necessary. Instead, the court can resolve the issue based
purely on documentary evidence, which may already be part of the
record or can be easily submitted by the parties.
In addition, with respect to sentencing claims, even when the
court finds there has been an error, the court does not necessarily
need to conduct a full resentencing. In cases where the original
sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum, the judge can
determine whether the error in the original sentence actually made a
difference in the result. If the error was harmless, the judge need not
impose a new sentence. Since the judge is analyzing the impact of the
error on his or her own decision, this sort of harmless-error review is
easier and more accurate than when a judge imagines what the jury
would have done absent an error at trial.
When there has been an error impacting the sentence, a full
resentencing may still not be required in some cases. As described
above, § 2255 provides that a judge may "resentence" or "correct the
sentence."439 If the error was guideline-based and did not affect the
applicable statutory range for the sentence, then the court could
determine that the appropriate remedy is to simply impose a new
sentence within the corrected-Guideline range-much as courts
reduced sentences in crack cases pursuant to the retroactive
Guideline amendments." 0 Such a sentence reduction may not even
require the presence of the prisoner in court. Thus, although courts
plainly have the power to grant a full resentencing under § 2255, in
some instances they might simply reduce the sentence without a
narrower range of conduct than the enhancement-in those circumstances, the
enhancement automatically applies. Id. However, if a conviction was obtained under a
state statute that is broader than the federal enhancement, then mere proof that the
defendant was convicted under the statute will not suffice to trigger the enhancement. Id.
Instead, the enhancement is triggered only if the conviction was narrowed in scope during
the prior proceeding to within-enhancements limits. Id. If the conviction resulted from
trial, it triggers the federal enhancement only if the charging paper and jury instructions
"actually required [the jury] to find all the elements" of the enhancement provision. Id.
(citing Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602). If the conviction resulted from a guilty plea, then the court
determines whether it was narrowed by looking at "the terms of the charging document,
the terms of a plea agreement or transcript of colloquy between judge and defendant in
which the factual basis for the plea was confirmed by the defendant, or to some
comparable judicial record of this information." Id. at 26. Thus, whether a prior conviction
triggers an enhancement depends on what state records establish regarding the nature of
the defendant's prior conviction. Id. The inquiry does not focus on what the defendant
actually did. Id. In resolving the collateral attack, the court will not engage in fact-finding
about the defendant's conduct. Id. Indeed, such fact-finding might violate the Sixth
Amendment's jury trial right. Id. at 25-26.
439. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b) (2006); see supra text accompanying notes 377-79.
440. See supra note 380.
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hearing. Since 2008, federal district courts have processed more than
25,000 motions for sentence reduction under the crack
amendments." A similarly efficient process could be devised to
correct Begay-type errors, which impact far fewer cases.42
Even where a resentencing is needed because of a sentencing
error, the process will not be very time consuming-particularly as
compared to conducting a new trial. To conduct a resentencing, the
judge will simply need to read an update to the presentence report,
which will likely contain a relatively short account of the defendant's
conduct in prison, and any additional sentencing memoranda from
the parties. The court will not need to reevaluate Guideline
determinations that were previously made and not the basis for
granting the resentencing. The actual court proceeding should not
take any longer than the original sentencing-usually less than an
hour. In addition, the resentencing process would not consume much
in the way of resources from others involved in the process. The
probation officer may well be the same person involved in the
original case, and it is not difficult to update a presentence report
with information on the defendant's conduct in prison. Counsel for
the defendant and government may also be the same original players
and thus already have a familiarity with the case.
For these reasons, sentencing errors are relatively easy to
identify and fix. In contrast, conviction-based errors are often harder
to evaluate and are certainly much more resource-intensive to
correct. If the conviction is vacated, the entire process begins again.
Resources need to be expended on a new trial or plea negotiations,
and another sentencing proceeding if conviction results."
441. See supra note 380.
442. Career offender sentences are imposed in only approximately 2,250 cases a year,
and many cases will not involve Begay-type errors at all. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N,
supra note 71, at tbl. 22. In addition to career offender cases, sentences in firearm and
illegal reentry cases could also involve Begay-type errors. However, these sentences will
be shorter than career offender sentences, and many individuals will have been released
before they would have an opportunity to obtain collateral relief. See generally Carissa
Byrne Hessick, Ineffective Assistance at Sentencing, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1069, 1072-73 (2009)
(arguing that articulating legal standards governing ineffective assistance of counsel claims
at sentencings will not open the floodgates because only defendants serving sentences of
more than a few years will have the opportunity to raise such a claim at all). Hessick also
argues that the "costs associated with a remand for new sentencing-when compared to
the costs of a new trial or a new capital sentencing hearing-are limited." Id. at 1073.
443. This discussion is based on the author's experience as an assistant federal
defender in the District of Connecticut.
444. Lower courts have also rarely explored the differences with respect to resources
when a sentence is vacated rather than there being a conviction. The Second Circuit has,
however, pointed to resource differences when adopting a more relaxed standard for
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There is another important resources issue at play when a
prisoner seeks correction of a sentence. When a court reduces a
sentence of incarceration, funds are freed up because the government
no longer needs to pay for the same length of incarceration. It costs
approximately $28,000 per year for the federal government to
incarcerate someone."5 Why should the government continue to pay
for a sentence that is inappropriate under a proper interpretation of
law? If a cost-benefit analysis is used to influence the scope of habeas
review, shouldn't the additional cost of the erroneous incarceration
be part of the calculus?
Finally, it is important to recognize that imposing strict
procedural barriers on habeas petitions does not mean that there will
be an absence of resources spent on habeas litigation. Prisoners will
reviewing unpreserved sentencing errors on appeal. United States v. Williams, 399 F.3d
450, 456 (2d Cir. 2005). In the wake of Booker, the Second Circuit determined that for
unpreserved Sixth Amendment claims "there is no need to apply the plain error doctrine
in the sentencing context with precisely the same procedure that has been used in the
context of review of errors occurring at trial, whether civil or criminal." Id. at 457. In
reaching this conclusion, Judge Newman noted that "[i]n recognition of the costs of a
second trial to remedy an unpreserved error, a reviewing court uses the power to order
one 'sparingly.'" Id. at 456 (quoting Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 389 (1999)). In
contrast, "the context of review of a sentencing error is fundamentally different." Id. In
particular:
From the standpoint of the parties, the error might have great significance. An
error yielding an unduly low sentence would deny the public its entitlement to a
sentence sufficient to achieve the purposes of punishment. An error yielding an
unduly high sentence would deny the defendant freedom for some length of time.
More importantly, the cost of correcting a sentencing error is far less than the cost
of a retrial. A resentencing is a brief event, normally taking less than a day and
requiring the attendance of only the defendant, counsel, and court personnel.
Equally important, review of a sentencing error, unlike a trial error, does not
require the appellate court to make its estimate of whether it thinks the outcome
would have been non-trivially different had the error not occurred. The district
court, familiar with that type of task and able to receive submissions of
information that is not part of the existing record and that might have been
submitted at the time of the original sentence had the Booker standards been in
effect, can answer the question whether those standards would have resulted in a
non-trivially different sentence at that time. Such an inquiry is very similar to a
district court's task in cases where the outcome of a bench trial is remanded for
reconsideration untainted by an error.
Id. Thus, the court reasoned that fewer resources are expended in the context of sentence
review not only because resentencings are easier to perform, but because the court can
assess the actual impact of an error. Id. These same considerations are applicable in the
collateral review setting.
445. See Annual Determination of Average Cost of Incarceration, 76 Fed. Reg. 57,081,
57,081 (Sept. 15, 2011) (stating that the cost of incarceration of federal inmates for the
2010 fiscal year was $28,284).
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continue to seek relief, and litigation over procedure in habeas cases
expends considerable resources. The barriers to relief are not
absolute: there are judicial exceptions even to strict statutory
restrictions, such as the statute of limitations and the ban on
successive petitions."6 Judicial and prosecutorial resources must be
spent resolving these issues, which are at times complex. For example,
it takes much more time for a court to figure out whether to consider
a Begay-type claim on the merits than it takes to actually consider the
merits of the claim. In some cases, litigation over finality will take
more time than identifying and fixing the mistake."
A recent case, United States v. Wyatt," reveals the incredible
amount of judicial resources that can be expended in avoiding the
correction of an undisputed sentencing error."' In Wyatt, the
defendant was erroneously sentenced as a career offender based on a
walkaway escape from a halfway house,"so which Chambers v. United
States established was not a career offender predicate. 451 His case was
considered at least six times by the Seventh Circuit, three times by the
district court in Texas, and once by the Fifth Circuit.? The Seventh
Circuit, in rejecting his claim on procedural grounds, stated:
Wyatt would not be sentenced as a career offender today and
likely would receive a substantially lower sentence; the
taxpayer is footing the bill to keep Wyatt in prison far longer
than Congress or the Sentencing Commission intended, but
there is no longer any judicial procedure to remedy the
situation. At this point, only the executive branch has the
authority to grant Wyatt the relief he seeks .... As matters
stand now, Wyatt's claims are being batted back and forth
between two circuits with differing views of how (and perhaps
446. See supra Section III.A.2.
447. Judith Resnik's observation several decades ago that "habeas litigation is now
litigation about finality" is even more true today. Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REV.
840, 962 (1984). Resnik observed then:
My own guess is that the time saved by virtue of the cases not filed is far
outweighed by the time spent picking through the cases filed to decide whether to
think about the merits. While the Court has constricted the number of applications
that may be considered on the merits, the Court has not made the search for those
rare petitions easier or quicker.
Id. at 961.
448. 672 F.3d 519 (7th Cir. 2012).
449. Id. at 519-20.
450. Id. at 520.
451. Id. at 520-21.
452. Id. at 520-23.
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whether) he may be heard on the merits of his claim. This is an
untenable and unseemly waste of judicial resources.
In sum, although correcting sentencing errors in federal cases at
the collateral review stage expends resources, the drain on the system
is considerably less than in the context of courts vacating convictions.
Moreover, resources are actually saved by not incarcerating someone
for longer than is proper under a correct interpretation of law. Lower
courts have rarely noted these significant resource differences.
3. Stale Evidence
Those advocating for greater finality of criminal convictions also
cite a concern about stale evidence. In some instances, the longer the
delay, the less accurate the fact-finding will be about the matter giving
rise to the collateral attack. In addition, when a conviction is vacated,
it may be difficult to obtain a conviction after retrial. Witnesses may
die or forget things; physical evidence may decay.454
Staleness of evidence is typically less of a concern with § 2255
motions as compared to § 2254 petitions because § 2255 proceedings
tend to occur closer in time to the original conviction.4 55 In addition,
many sentencing-based claims brought in § 2255 motions relate to
legal interpretations of statutory and Guideline provisions and will
not require a hearing or new evidence to resolve.
If an error is found, vacating a sentence raises fewer concerns
about stale evidence. When a sentence is altered, a guilty defendant
does not go unpunished-the conviction stands, and it is simply a
matter of determining the appropriate punishment. At a new
sentencing proceeding, the court may still rely on the original
presentence report and on Guideline determinations previously made
that were not the basis for the error. The court, unlike a jury, may
also rely on its previous fact-finding, and hearsay rules do not bar
admission of evidence.456 Thus, vacating a sentence does not raise the
same staleness-of-evidence concerns as vacating a conviction.
The only real change at the time of imposing the new sentence
453. Id. at 524 (citation omitted).
454. See supra notes 399, 412 and accompanying text.
455. Section 2254 petitions are brought only after post-conviction litigation in the state
has concluded. See Lasch, supra note 151, at 57 (arguing that "intra-system postconviction
proceedings occur earlier in time than federal habeas review" and "[t]his reduces Judge
Friendly's concern that accurate factfinding would not be possible in collateral
proceedings and on retrial, as his concern increases in direct proportion to the amount of
time that elapses between conviction and subsequent litigation events").
456. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 250 (1949).
152 [Vol. 91
2012] CORRECTION OF SENTENCING ERRORS
may be the circumstances of the defendant. But in this instance, the
passage of time could actually enhance the court's ability to
determine an appropriate sentence. If the court grants a full
resentencing, the court can consider the defendant's conduct in
prison. The court thus has additional relevant information absent at
the earlier proceeding. The court may determine that the person's
extraordinary efforts at rehabilitation justify a shorter sentence than
the one originally imposed, even absent the impact of whatever error
led to the resentencing. In contrast, if the person has engaged in
violent conduct while in prison, the court may determine that the
prisoner continues to present a threat to society and should be
incapacitated for a longer period of time. In this sense, the evidence
at the resentencing has ripened rather than spoiled.
With Begay-type claims, staleness of evidence is of minimal
concern.4 57 In determining the merits of the collateral attack, the
court considers whether a prior conviction in fact should have
triggered the federal enhancement.458 To make this evaluation, the
court looks at records from a prior court proceeding.459 These
records-which show the nature of the prior conviction-were set in
stone at the time of the prior proceeding, and have not changed at all
between the time of the federal sentencing and the time of the
collateral review.4 6 In determining whether recidivist enhancements
apply, courts do not hear from witnesses or find facts regarding the
conduct underlying a defendant's prior conviction.46' Records of
convictions do not go "stale" in the way that witnesses and some
types of physical evidence may. Thus, resolving a collateral attack
457. Staleness of evidence is more of a concern when the claim relates to an
enhancement that requires the sentencing court to resolve a disputed factual issue. For
example, a prisoner might assert that a firearm enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(1) of the
Guidelines was unwarranted because a gun was not present during a drug deal. The
government would have much more difficultly establishing this type of factual matter
many years later in a collateral proceeding.
458. Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005).
459. Id.
460. See Sarah French Russell, Rethinking Recidivist Enhancements: The Role of Prior
Drug Convictions in Federal Sentencing, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1135, 1220-21 (2010). In
some instances, it is possible that the actual prior records (usually from state proceedings)
were not obtained at the first federal sentencing proceeding, and the court simply relied
on a rap sheet in enhancing the sentence. In some of these cases, the records will have
been destroyed pursuant to state record keeping rules, sometime between the time of the
federal sentencing and the collateral review. Id. However, it seems more likely that either
(1) the records were obtained at the time of the sentencing and can be reviewed at the
time of the collateral review or (2) the records had already been destroyed by the time of
the sentencing and thus were never available.
461. Shepard, 544 U.S. at 26.
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that alleges an erroneous recidivist sentencing enhancement generally
does not become more difficult with the passage of time. Moreover, if
relief is granted, then the accuracy of the new sentencing
determination is likely not negatively impacted by the passage of
time. If the government cannot obtain an enhancement at a
resentencing after a successful collateral attack, it is because the
documents regarding the prior conviction did not, and never did,
prove the enhancement-not because a witness died or forgot
something with the passage of time.
4. Rehabilitation and Deterrence
Scholars and courts have also maintained that a lack of finality in
criminal judgments undermines the deterrence and rehabilitation
goals of criminal law. Some have asserted that effective deterrence is
undermined if would-be criminals observe that criminal judgments do
not always stand up, and endless litigation in cases prevents prisoners
from accepting their fate and beginning the process of
rehabilitation. 462 These arguments have been subject to scholarly
critique on various grounds463 and seem particularly weak in the
context of the correction of sentencing errors.
With respect to deterrence, as Bator himself noted, the swiftness
and certainty of conviction, rather than sentence severity, is most
relevant to effective deterrence.4M Shortening a sentence will not tell
would-be criminals that they might get off scott-free from their
criminal acts. Moreover, evidence suggests that people are better
deterred by a system that they view as just and legitimate.465 Making
people serve unjust sentences is unlikely to promote their respect for
the law. Regarding rehabilitation, federal law specifically provides
that "imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting
correction and rehabilitation,"466 and last term, the Supreme Court
462. See supra notes 393-94, 421 and accompanying text.
463. Lasch, supra note 151, at 58 (finding that no evidence exists to support the claim
that collateral attacks actually weaken deterrence or rehabilitation); Issachar Rosen-Zvi &
Talia Fisher, Overcoming Procedural Boundaries, 94 VA. L. REV. 79, 89 (2008) (stating
that the conviction of an innocent person prevents the rehabilitation of the actual guilty
party); Katherine J. Strandburg, Deterrence and the Conviction of Innocents, 35 CONN. L.
REV. 1321, 1321 (2003) ("If increased conviction rates are accompanied by less accurate
determination of guilt-and hence increased conviction of the innocent-increasing the
conviction rate can actually decrease deterrence.").
464. Bator, supra note 12, at 452 n.21 ("It is of course a commonplace of classical
criminal-law theory that certainty and immediacy of punishment are more crucial
elements of effective deterrence than its severity.").
465. See, e.g., Fagan & Meares, supra note 49, at 176.
466. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) (2006).
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held that federal courts may not impose or lengthen a prison term in
order to foster a defendant's rehabilitation.46 7 It would seem
inconsistent with these principles to deny collateral sentencing review
based on the view that more time in prison is fostering rehabilitation.
Moreover, empirical evidence suggests that lengthy prison sentences
can be counter-productive to rehabilitation.4' Thus, the argument
that the availability of collateral review of sentencing errors delays a
prisoner's rehabilitation is far from compelling.
5. Harms to Victims from Continued Litigation
Advocates for victims' rights argue that a lack of finality of
criminal judgments and prolonged litigation harms victims.469 A
victim may feel some closure after a defendant has been convicted
and sentenced. If a lengthy sentence is imposed, the victim may feel a
sense of security knowing that the offender will not be released for a
long time. Collateral review of convictions and sentences can disrupt
this sense of closure and security. In addition, the review process itself
may require the victim to relive the event. Should the conviction be
vacated, the victim may have to testify at another trial, and there is a
risk that conviction will not be obtained.
Although the harm to victims from a lack of finality is quite real,
collateral attacks on federal sentences should be somewhat less
concerning from a victim's perspective. In these cases, the conviction
will still stand, and the defendant will likely not be immediately
released. In addition, it bears emphasizing that in many federal cases,
there is no identifiable victim. In 2010, 28.9% of all federal offenders
were sentenced under the drug Guideline, and most of these cases
likely do not involve an identifiable victim.470 In addition, 34.4% of
offenders were sentenced under immigration Guidelines.471 The vast
majority of these offenses (more than 80%) were illegal reentry
crimes, which have no identifiable victim. 47 2 Thus, concerns about the
impact of finality on victims are reduced in the § 2255 context.
6. Psychological Benefits of Finality for Society
In addition to the finality considerations discussed above, some
467. Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382, 2385 (2011).
468. See Russell, supra note 460, at 1152 & nn. 83-85 (collecting studies).
469. See, e.g., Susan L. Karamanian, Victims' Rights and the Death-Sentenced Inmate:
Some Observations and Thoughts, 29 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1025, 1031 (1998).
470. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT 35 (2010).
471. Id. at fig. A.
472. Id. at 35.
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have argued that finality offers psychological benefits to society.
Bator describes a psychological benefit to society that comes from
feeling that "we have tried hard enough and thus may take it that
justice has been done," and he sees harm coming from a system
catering to "a perpetual and unreasoned anxiety that there is a
possibility that error has been made in every criminal case in the legal
system."' Judge Friendly also emphasized "the human desire that
things must sometime come to an end."474
These arguments are certainly subject to criticism,475 and they
undoubtedly carry less weight in the sentencing context. Society
already lives with more uncertainty about the length of criminal
sentences than about the finality of guilt-innocence determinations.
In many jurisdictions, the opportunity for parole exists, and there can
thus be a great deal of uncertainty about how much time a prisoner
will actually spend in prison.476 In addition, states often change rules
regarding the calculation of good time credit, particularly in times of
budgetary crises.477 Thus, society already copes with uncertainty
regarding the length of sentences. Broadening collateral review of
sentences surely has less of a psychological impact than a broader
scope of conviction-based review.
C. Federal Judges: A Reluctance to Look Back?
As discussed above, the arguments supporting finality are
particularly weak with respect to Begay-type claims. Yet courts, for
the most part, have refused to fix Begay-type errors. Given that
finality interests are much less pronounced in the context of collateral
review of a sentence, and Begay-type errors are so easy to fix, are
there other factors that might help explain the reluctance of federal
courts to resentence?
Judges may be reluctant to revisit sentences because they have
become accustomed to not looking back. As a practical matter,
federal judges today are rarely required to reconsider their sentencing
decisions. Once the sentence is declared, the judge moves on to
another case and does not look at the sentence again except in rare
473. Bator, supra note 12, at 452-53.
474. Friendly, supra note 402, at 149.
475. See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 447, at 853-54.
476. See WILLIAM J. SABOL ET AL., THE INFLUENCE OF TRUTH-IN-SENTENCING
REFORMS ON CHANGES IN STATES' SENTENCING PRACTICES AND PRISON
POPULATIONS 7 (2002).
477. Cecelia Klingele, The Early Demise of Early Release, 114 W. VA. L. REV. 415, 439
(2012).
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cases. To the extent federal judges see defendants again, it is after
they have been released and they have violated some condition of
supervised release.
Out of all the cases sentenced, less than one percent will likely
return to the sentencing court after an appeal." Although there are
several other mechanisms that allow the sentencing court to modify a
sentence, these mechanisms are narrowly circumscribed and used
infrequently. A court may correct clear errors under Rule 35(a) only
within fourteen days of sentencing. 479 Courts may also reduce "final"
sentences if the government files a motion under Rule 35(b) based on
the defendant's post-sentencing cooperation" or if the Bureau of
Prisons ("BOP") files a motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1).48 1 But in
2010, sentences were reduced in only 2,006 cases pursuant to
government motion and in thirty-four cases pursuant to BOP
motion.482 Courts may also modify sentences based on changes to the
Sentencing Guidelines that have been made retroactive by the
Sentencing Commission,483 but historically this mechanism has been
used infrequently because so few Guideline amendments have been
made retroactive.4 8 Courts modify sentences based on § 2255 motions
in very few cases-only 150 sentences were changed in this fashion in
2010.485 Accordingly, federal resentencing is incredibly rare.
The lack of judicial experience with resentencing is a relatively
recent phenomenon. At common law, a sentencing judge could
correct an illegal sentence at any time and could revise a legal
sentence after it was imposed for any reason-including simply "a
change of heart"-up until the end of the "term of court."486 The
original Rule 35 retained the power of courts to resentence within a
478. From March 2009 to March 2010, 88,973 defendants were convicted and sentenced
in federal courts. ADMIN. OFFICE FOR THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CASELOAD STATISTICS, tbl. D-4 (2011). During that time period, 9,913 criminal appeals
were terminated on the merits. Id. tbl. B-5. Out of this number, only 757 (or 7.6%) were
reversed or remanded to the district court. Id.
479. FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(a).
480. Id. 35(b).
481. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1) (2006).
482. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 470, at tbl. 62.
483. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2006).
484. Indeed, out of the 760 amendments to the Guidelines since they were first
promulgated, less than thirty are retroactive. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 111.10 & app. C (2011). Although there was a recent spike in the number of sentences
modified under § 3582(c)(1) because of the recent retroactive crack amendments to the
Guidelines, the number of modifications has usually been very low. See U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N, supra note 470, at tbl. 62.
485. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 470, at tbl. 62.
486. Rittenberg, supra note 43, at 290.
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period of time based on a defendant's "plea of leniency" and a judge's
further reflection and change of heart.487 Indeed, the purpose of Rule
35 was to "give every convicted defendant a second round before the
sentencing judge."'" This change-of-heart discretion was eliminated
by the SRA, which also eliminated the court's ability to correct an
illegal sentence at any time.'8 Moreover, the SRA eliminated parole,
which had also contributed to a sense that a federal sentence was not
truly final, but would be looked at again after a period of time to
determine the appropriate release date.4" Thus, historically, the
moment of imposition of sentence may have carried less of a sense of
finality, and judges may have been more open to modification of
sentences down the road. In contrast, under the modern procedural
regime, judges may have grown accustomed to not looking back at
sentences. A judge who has little experience in reconsidering
sentences may be reluctant to do so, even when faced with compelling
circumstances and a plain error.
In addition to these procedural considerations, various other
factors may help to explain the reluctance to resentence. A recent
article about Denny Chin, a former federal district judge and now
circuit judge, sheds some light on this issue. The New York Times
reported:
[Judge Chin] took the bench in 1994 at age 40 with little
experience in criminal law. He has since sentenced more than
1,100 defendants, including at least a dozen who received
sentences of life or the equivalent, according to court statistics.
He quickly learned, he said, that preparation was crucial and
that he must not agonize over his decisions. One seasoned
judge had advised: "Rule and roll." Be decisive. Don't second-
guess yourself.491
A "rule and roll" philosophy may be necessary in the daily life of
487. Id. at 291.
488. United States v. Ellenbogen, 390 F,2d 537, 543 (2d Cir. 1968) (explaining that the
objective of Rule 35 was to "give every convicted defendant a second round before the
sentencing judge" and afford "the judge an opportunity to reconsider the sentence in ...
light of any further information about the defendant or the case which may have been
presented to him in the interim").
489. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 212, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.).
490. Id.; see U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.2 (2011) (stating that
"[t]he Act also abolishes parole"). Today, absent very narrow exceptions, a defendant will
serve at least eighty-five percent of the sentence. Id. § 1A1.3.
491. Benjamin Weiser, A Judge's Education, One Sentence at a Time, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
9, 2011, at MB1.
158 [Vol. 91
2012] CORRECTION OF SENTENCING ERRORS
judging. Judges, like everyone, need to manage their workloads. They
may be concerned that reconsidering a sentencing decision in a single
case will open the "floodgates" to many other resentencings and take
time away from other pressing matters.492
The "rule and roll" mindset also suggests that finality or
"decisiveness" itself is valued heavily in judging. Judges make
judgments. It is not judicial to look back and second-guess decisions.
For these reasons, the quality of review may be diminished when the
sentencing judge reviews his or her own sentence, rather than the
decision of another judge.4 93 If one views decisiveness as an essential
part of being a federal judge, that places a thumb firmly on the side of
the scale containing the erroneous sentence.94 Judges may also be
concerned that acknowledging the mistake will make the public think
that they "got it wrong," and this will diminish their reputation and
authority.4 95
In addition, as Judge Friendly observed, there is a "human desire
that things must sometime come to an end."496 Judges typically put
criminal cases behind them after imposing a sentence, and they are
rarely called upon to look back. Although the prisoner lives each day
that follows with the sentence, the judge will not see the prisoner
again after he or she has served one year in prison, or two years, or
492. The Eleventh Circuit in Gilbert placed great emphasis on the "floodgates"
concern. Gilbert v. United States, 640 F.3d 1293, 1310 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc) ("And
the rule Gilbert is seeking could not be confined to sentence miscalculations based on
enhancement errors. If the savings clause operates to allow attacks on old sentences that
were lengthened by enhancements that later decisions have called into doubt, there is no
reason it would not also operate to do the same with any other guidelines calculation
error. As a result, no federal judgment imposing a sentence would be truly final until the
sentence was completely served or the prisoner had gone on to face a different kind of
final judgment."), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1001 (2012). As described above, workload
concerns appear overstated in the Begay context given the relative ease of identifying and
correcting these types of errors.
493. See Resnik, supra note 447, at 906-10 (discussing the competing values at issue in
the procedural structure of § 2255).
494. Judge Chin showed through the interviews with the New York Times a unique
willingness to "look back" at cases and publicly reflect on his sentencing decisions, noting
that sentencing was the "the hardest thing" about being a judge. Weiser, supra note 491, at
MB1. He explained: "It is just not a natural or everyday thing to do ... to pass judgment
on people, to send them to prison or not." Id.
495. One would not expect this to be a major factor with respect to claims based on
intervening changes in the law. In scenarios like Begay, circuit precedent dictated the
erroneous result-the error was not the result of a mistake made by the individual
sentencing judge. United States v. Begay, 377 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1144-45 (D.N.M. 2005).
Thus, you would not expect judges to be defensive about their original decisions.
496. Friendly, supra note 402, at 149.
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ten.497 The current regime provides a distancing between the act of
imposing sentence and its impact.4 98 There may be a certain
unpleasantness in revisiting something that one had thought was in
the past.
A final factor that might play a role is that sentencing
proceedings are now usually the main event for district judges in
federal criminal cases. Issues of pretrial release are determined by
magistrate judges; pretrial motions such as motions to suppress the
evidence are rarely pursued; and the trial has virtually disappeared-
more than ninety-six percent of federal convictions are obtained by
guilty plea.49 9 District judges play no role in plea negotiations. Plea
proceedings are often referred to magistrate judges, and even when
district judges conduct them, the proceedings tend to be uneventful
and follow a standard script. Sentencing becomes the focus for judges
in federal criminal cases. Even though the proceedings are relatively
short, judges may feel that the sentencing amounts to the bulk of the
case. Thus, a judge may view the decision to grant a resentencing to
be equivalent to revisiting the entire case again. Objectively speaking,
however, vacating a conviction drains resources to a much greater
degree, and a resentencing is a relatively minor task.
D. Other Interests at Stake
The finality interests identified above are not without relevance
in the sentencing context. Bator, Friendly, and others have raised
valid arguments about the harms to society of a procedural system
catering to unwarranted anxiety about errors in criminal cases.so
Similarly, a court system would not function well with judges who are
constantly second guessing themselves and who are unable to move
their attention on to new matters. And although the other arguments
497. Supreme Court Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, in a 2003 speech to the ABA
Annual Meeting, remarked on the lack of attention by judges and lawyers to what
happens to a prisoner after he is "taken away." Justice Anthony Kennedy, Address at the
American Bar Association Annual Meeting (Aug. 9, 2003) (transcript available at http://
new.abanet.org/sections/criminaljustice/PublicDocuments/JusticeKennedySpeech.pdf). He
observed: "The focus of the legal profession, perhaps even the obsessive focus, has been
on the process for determining guilt or innocence. When someone has been judged guilty
and the appellate and collateral review process has ended, the legal profession seems to
lose all interest. When the prisoner is taken away, our attention turns to the next case.
When the door is locked against the prisoner, we do not think about what is behind it." Id.
498. Some judges seem to make a concerted effort to counter this distancing. For
example, Judge Stefan Underhill in the District of Connecticut comes off the bench and
shakes hands with each defendant after sentencing.
499. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 71, at fig. C.
500. See supra notes 473-474 and accompanying text.
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favoring finality-preservation of resources, concern about stale
evidence, and harm to victims-are weaker in the sentencing context,
they are not non-existent. Yet does the fact that finality interests
carry some weight in the sentencing context justify refusal to correct
sentencing mistakes, such as Begay-type errors, which are easy to
identify and fix?
There are weighty counter-arguments to finality. Obviously,
individual prisoners have strong interests in correcting sentences that
were imposed on them in error. Often, Begay-type errors are causing
prisoners to spend many additional years in prison. For a prisoner
who is serving five extra years based on a drunk driving conviction
that should not have triggered an enhancement, treating the sentence
as final hardly fosters the prisoner's rehabilitation. Rather, the failure
of the court to correct the sentence may cause the prisoner to feel
angry and disrespected by society. It is important for society to treat
all of its members with dignity and fairness. Convicted people should
feel that their sentences have been determined through fair
procedures and that the results are just. Permitting injustice to stand
can cause unrest and undermine safety in institutions."o'
In addition, the broader society is undoubtedly harmed by
leaving major injustices uncorrected.5 02 Society has an interest in
seeing people sentenced correctly in accordance with its laws.
Allowing people to continue to serve years of extra prison time
despite a plain error in their sentence undermines the legitimacy of
the criminal justice system-particularly when some racial or ethnic
groups are disproportionally impacted by lengthy federal sentences
and recidivist enhancements. 3 As scholars have remarked, when
501. Cf. Dependants-Appellees' [sic] Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc at
11, Peralta v. Vasquez, No. 04-2822-pr., 2006 WL 4452743 (2d. Cir. Oct. 30, 2006) (noting
that permitting inmates to waive claims for restoration of good time to allow them to bring
§ 1983 claims could undermine institutional security). The New York Solicitor General's
Office stated: "The Court should also consider the potential impact on the safety and
security of DOCS's facilities if DOCS were to do what the panel authorizes. Despite any
'waiver,' if DOCS persists in denying an inmate good time based on an unconstitutional
determination, this would understandably be perceived by the inmate population as
blatant defiance of the federal courts. The likely negative effect on security is obvious." Id.
502. See Dist. Attorney's Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 98
(2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("While we have long recognized that States have an
interest in securing the finality of their judgments, finality is not a stand-alone value that
trumps a State's overriding interest in ensuring that justice is done in its courts and
secured to its citizens." (citations omitted)).
503. The United States Sentencing Commission recently found that Hispanic offenders
accounted for the largest group of offenders convicted of an offense carrying a mandatory
minimum penalty, followed by Black offenders. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, REPORT TO
CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE
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individuals view a criminal justice system as illegitimate, its
commands are less likely to deter them from crime.sm
Moreover, we should want judges to feel a sense of moral duty to
correct their own mistakes. Bator says that he can "imagine nothing
more subversive of a judge's sense of responsibility, of the inner
subjective conscientiousness which is so essential a part of the difficult
and subtle art of judging well, than an indiscriminate acceptance of
the notion that all the shots will always be called by someone else."s"s
It is questionable whether any judge actually thinks like this. And
more troublesome than the system Bator fears is a system that does
not allow the prisoner to have the shot called by anyone at all. In
Begay-type situations, where there has been an intervening
clarification of law, prisoners are not getting a chance to have a judge
consider the merits of their claims under the correct interpretation of
the law.506
SYSTEM 124 (2011). The career offender enhancement disproportionately impacts
minority offenders. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES
SENTENCING 133 (2004) (finding that twenty-six percent of offenders sentenced in 2000
were African American offenders, but African American offenders constituted fifty-eight
percent of those subject to the career offender provision).
504. See, e.g., Fagan & Meares, supra note 49, at 176. See generally Tracey Meares, The
Legitimacy of Police Among Young African-American Men, 92 MARO. L. REv. 651, 656-
58 (2009) (arguing that a person's views regarding the legitimacy of the criminal justice
system influence the likelihood that he or she will comply with the law).
505. Bator, supra note 12, at 451.
506. Given the weaker finality interests at stake in the sentencing context, should the
government be able to obtain a longer sentence when an intervening clarification of law
reveals that a sentencing error worked to a prisoner's benefit? If a case is still on direct
appeal, the government may utilize new case law, and is subject to the same plain error
standard as a defendant for errors not raised below. See, e.g., United States v. Barajas-
Nunez, 91 F.3d 826, 830 (6th Cir. 1996). However, only the prisoner may seek resentencing
after the sentence has become final. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (Supp. 2011) ("A prisoner in
custody under sentence of a court ... may move ..... (emphasis added)); id. § 2241(c)
("The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless . . ." (emphasis added)).
Should the government have a mechanism for seeking resentencing at this later stage?
Some of the justifications for finality of sentences are weak, regardless of whether the
government or the prisoner claims error. For example, an error that resulted from a court
too narrowly defining a recidivist enhancement provision would be relatively easy to
identify and fix, and staleness of evidence does not present a major concern if the
government requests resentencing based on this form of error. Moreover, society has an
interest in ensuring that its laws are applied correctly-whether the government or the
prisoner is seeking the correct application of the law. However, there are some major
differences between the prisoner and government seeking resentencing. Society's interest
in "repose" should not carry much weight when a prisoner seeks correction of a sentencing
error because society already lives with uncertainty about the actual length of time that
prisoners will serve. However, if the government sought to increase a sentence years after
it was imposed, there would be much more direct psychological damage to the prisoner.
Imagine serving four and a half years of what you think is a five-year sentence, only to
2012] CORRECTION OF SENTENCING ERRORS
CONCLUSION
Recent Supreme Court decisions have demonstrated that many
prisoners are currently serving sentences that were improperly
enhanced. 0 Despite the clear and undisputed errors in these
sentences, federal courts are reluctant to fix them. The aftermath of
these cases has revealed that lower courts are overemphasizing the
value of finality of sentences.
Courts should fix more sentencing errors at the collateral review
stage. There is a compelling argument that a prisoner should be able
to obtain collateral relief where there has been a substantive
intervening clarification of law impacting the length of the prisoner's
sentence and he or she has not had an opportunity to previously seek
relief. Although courts have excused procedural barriers when an
intervening court decision impacts the conviction, they are often
applying stricter standards to sentencing-based claims. Yet the finality
interests are quite weak in the sentencing context. Given the balance
of interests at stake, sentencing errors should be easier to fix than
conviction-based errors, not harder to fix.
Lower courts could correct many more sentencing mistakes
consistent with statutory provisions and Supreme Court law.
However, in light of the reluctance of courts to resentence and the
emerging conflicts in the circuits over how to treat sentencing errors
in collateral proceedings, the Supreme Court or Congress should
intervene to clarify the power of the courts to fix these types of
mistakes. The Court or Congress can craft clear exceptions to finality
in sentencing that will not open the door to unwarranted litigation
and resentencings. This approach would promote notions of fairness,
would strengthen the legitimacy of the federal criminal justice system,
and could ultimately save resources that are currently being spent
litigating procedural issues and incarcerating people for longer than is
appropriate under the law. These injustices can and should be
corrected.
learn that you have five more years to go? It is fair for prisoners to live with some
uncertainly about sentence length during the appeals process (as they do under current
law). But at a certain point, prisoners should have certainty about the outer reach of the
time they must serve. If a prisoner does choose to seek review under § 2255, he might be
said to have accepted the risk that things could get worse, and perhaps the government
should be able to take advantage of any changes in the law at a resentencing hearing.
However, unless a prisoner chooses to reopen a case under § 2255, the government should
not be able to seek a higher sentence after the direct appeal process is concluded.
507. Johnson v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1265, 1268-69 (2010); Chambers v. United
States, 555 U.S. 122, 123-24 (2009).
163
164 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91
